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Abstract—Users’ devices, e.g., smartphones or laptops, are typ-
ically incapable of securely storing and processing cryptographic
keys. We present TANDEM, a novel set of protocols for securing
cryptographic keys with support from a central server. TANDEM
uses one-time-use key-share tokens to, unlike traditional threshold-
cryptographic solutions, preserve users’ privacy with respect to
a malicious central server. Additionally, TANDEM enables users
to block their keys if they lose their shares, and it enables the
server to limit how often an adversary can use an unblocked
key. We prove TANDEM’s security and privacy properties, and
we empirically show that it causes little overhead using a proof of
concept implementation. To illustrate TANDEM’s advantages we
use it to secure attribute-based credentials keys using a central
server without hurting the privacy properties provided by the
credential system.
Index Terms—privacy, threshold cryptography, central server,
time-correlation attack
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of cryptographic schemes hinges on the se-
curity of the underlying keys. However, secure solutions to
store and process keys on users’ devices are hard to deploy
in practice. Software-based approaches are extremely difficult
to secure [1], [2], [3], [4], and secure hardware [5], [6], [7]
might not be available on users’ devices, not accessible to
developers [8], [9], or harmful to usability [10].
As an alternative, users could use a secure central server to
store their keys and perform cryptographic operations on their
behalf, and to block their keys if their devices are compro-
mised. The problem is that centralization introduces security
and privacy concerns that are not an issue when keys are
stored on the user’s device. First, users must trust the central
server to not impersonate them. Second, the central server
is in a privileged position to learn private information about
users from their interactions with other services. Branda˜o
et al. illustrate these problems in the context of nation-
scale brokered-identification systems [11]. They show how a
central hub that acts as the broker between users, identity
providers, and service providers can impersonate users, link
users’ transactions across different service providers, and also
learn private identifiable information about users.
A natural solution to the impersonation problem is to
involve the user in the storage and/or usage of the keys
by using threshold cryptography. This approach additionally
strengthens authentication security as the user needs a second
factor: a key share. However, threshold cryptography does not
address the privacy concerns associated with centralization.
The central server learns the users’ key-usage patterns and, as
the time of access and use of the key are almost the same,
it can use this information to deanonymize users’ anonymous
transactions, e.g., correlating interactions to public activities
such as updates to a blockchain ledger [12], [13].
In this work, we present TANDEM, a set of protocols that
augment threshold-cryptographic schemes to enable secure
and privacy-preserving usage of key shares managed by a
central server. To use a key, a user sends a one-time-use
key-share token to the central server using an anonymous
communication channel. This token contains a randomized
version of the central server’s key share for this user. The
server uses this key share to run the threshold-cryptographic
protocol without learning the user’s identity.
The construction of key-share tokens permits to decouple
the stages of obtaining and using the tokens, eliminating
the possibility of time-correlation attacks. Furthermore, the
one-time property enables two additional functionalities: the
blocking of keys in case the user’s key share is compromised,
and the rate limiting of key usage to restrict how often an
attacker can use an unblocked key. TANDEM provides these
functionalities without the need to identify token owners.
TANDEM can be used to secure the keys of any crypto-
graphic scheme (e.g., encryption, signature, or payments) for
which a linearly randomizable threshold-cryptographic version
of the scheme exists. As long as the threshold version is
private, i.e., the scheme does not require information that iden-
tifies the user besides the key, TANDEM ensures that not even a
malicious central server can learn with which user it is interact-
ing. For example, Tandem can be applied to threshold variants
of Schnorr [14] and RSA signatures [15], ElGamal-based
[16], [17] and RSA decryption [15], as well as threshold-
cryptographic versions of electronic cash schemes [18], [19]
and attribute-based credential schemes [20], [21], [22], [23].
We note, however, that Tandem cannot be applied to existing
threshold DSA schemes because they are multiplicative [24]
or require identifying auxiliary information [25].
To demonstrate the potential of TANDEM we use it to
secure keys in a threshold version of BBS+ attribute-based
credentials (ABCs). ABCs [20], [21], [22], [23] protect users’
anonymity during authentication on sensitive online services,
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e.g., online health services1. Thus, enhancing them with a
naı¨ve centralized approach in which the central server could
learn which sensitive services users access would defeat the
very purpose of ABCs. Using TANDEM to secure her keys,
the user can show her credential to the online service without
the TANDEM server learning who is using the key, preserving
the user’s privacy even if the TANDEM server and the service
provider collude. Moreover, the user never has the complete
key in her device.
The anonymity provided by ABCs opens the door to ma-
licious users abusing service providers. We also provide a
simple modification to the threshold ABC schemes that en-
ables service providers to confirm that TANDEM is used. Then,
as long as all users use TANDEM, TANDEM can replace the
complex ad-hoc cryptographic techniques to block users [26],
[27] or limit key-usage [28].
We validate the practicality of the TANDEM protocols on
a prototype C implementation. Using a key with TANDEM
induces a 50 – 100 ms overhead on the TANDEM server with
respect to traditional threshold-cryptographic solutions, and
only 5 ms overhead on the user. The cost for the server
is manageable. On the user side, the overhead is negligible
with respect to the delay imposed by the use of anonymous
communications necessary for typical uses of TANDEM such
as anonymous web-based authentication.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
X We introduce TANDEM; it enables the use of threshold-
cryptographic protocols with a central server to secure crypto-
graphic keys without this server learning what keys are used
by whom. Additionally, TANDEM enables blocking and rate
limiting of key usage.
XWe provide a threshold version of an attribute-based creden-
tial system, and show how TANDEM can be used to augment its
security. We show how the underlying constructions in TAN-
DEM permit rate limiting and revocation of credentials without
relying on complex purpose-built cryptographic techniques.
X We prove the security and privacy of TANDEM, and we
use a prototype implementation to validate its practicality. All
operations in TANDEM take less than one second, imposing a
reasonable overhead on both server and users.
II. RELATED WORK
Exisiting solutions to protect cryptographic keys fall into
two coarse categories, either single-party or decentralized. The
former typically rely on secure hardware [29], [7], [6], [5] that
securely stores and processes cryptographic keys within the
secure environment. However, secure hardware is expensive,
is not always available (e.g., in laptops) or not accessible by
application developers, and is often not flexible enough to run
advanced protocols.
Threshold cryptography aims to strengthen general cryp-
tographic protocols by distributing the user’s secret key
1such as https://medical.mit.edu/services/mental-health-counseling and
https://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/online-mental-health-services/Pages/
introduction.aspx
TABLE I: Comparison of generic and special-purpose TCPs
with TCPs augmented with Tandem.
Generic Purpose with TANDEM
e.g., [14], [17] [41], [21]
Anonymous key usage × × X
Hide protocol data × X ×*
Hide key-usage patterns × × X
* This property is irrelevant for TANDEM; see text.
among several parties. This approach was first proposed by
Desmedt [30] and Boyd [31]. Several threshold encryption
and signature schemes have been proposed since then [32],
[33], [34], [14], [15], [35], [36], [37]. More recently, Atwater
et al. [38] built a library to execute such protocols in users’
personal devices. Other works have tackled more complicated
protocols. For instance, Brands shows how to distribute the
user’s secret key in attribute-based credentials [21], and Keller
et al. [39] show how to make threshold-cryptographic versions
of zero-knowledge proofs.
Many works propose systems in which the user’s secret
key is shared between a user’s device and a central server
to protect the key and also to enable instant blocking of the
key by the user [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45]. However,
none of these schemes provide privacy for the user towards
the central server. In all of these schemes users authenticate
themselves to the server, making them susceptible to time-
correlation attacks [12]. Camenisch et al. [41] attempt to
ensure privacy to some extent in signature schemes by blinding
the message being signed during the threshold protocol with
the server. Yet, the server learns when and how often the
user uses her signing key. Hence, users are still vulnerable
to timing attacks. The scheme by Brands [21] protects against
these attacks as long as the key-share holder is a smartcard,
which cannot store a timed log of operations. However, if the
smartcard is replaced by an online server that holds the key
share, this server learns the key-usage patterns of users. Then,
the cryptographic measures proposed by Brands alone cannot
prevent time-correlation attacks.
TANDEM is designed to complement these threshold-
cryptographic solutions to make them privacy friendly. We
compare the privacy properties obtained when using TANDEM
with those in previous proposals in Table I. We consider
three privacy aspects: anonymity of the user when running the
threshold protocol (i.e., need to authenticate); hide the data
used (e.g., signed message) in the protocol from the server;
and hide the usage pattern to avoid timing attacks. Generic
schemes focus on achieving security of the secret key and thus
provide no privacy. Special-purpose designs, have so far only
focused on the protection of data involved in the protocol.
TANDEM does not need to protect this data: the other two
properties decouple the data from the user’s identity.
Finally, similarly to TANDEM, password-hardening ser-
vices [46], [47] use decentralization to increase security
against brute-force attacks. These schemes introduce a hard-
ening server that rate limits, or even blocks, requests from
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the main authentication server. However, the cryptographic
techniques behind these solutions cannot be directly applied to
the problem tackled by TANDEM. First, they are designed for
a particular task: securely verifying passwords, and adapting
them to run other protocols is non-trivial. Second, in the
password scenario the hardening server is only accessed by the
authentication server. Therefore, there are no privacy concerns,
and these techniques do not provide any privacy protection.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a scenario in which users are required to
perform cryptographic operations to interact with a service
provider (SP). Users use insecure devices, such as smart-
phones, tablets, or laptops, without secure hardware, to run
the cryptographic protocols. To keep their keys safe, they
use a centralized TANDEM Server (TS) to run threshold-
cryptographic protocols (TCPs) in a distributed way. Users
wish to keep their key-use pattern and their use of other
services private with respect to the TS. We call an execution
of the protocol between the user and the TS a transaction.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one TANDEM
server. However, we note secret-sharing the key with multiple
TANDEM servers would increase security. In this case TAN-
DEM would ensure that keys can be blocked and rate limited as
long as at least one of the TANDEM servers is honest. Privacy
is not affected by the number of servers.
A. TANDEM Properties and Threat model
PROPERTY 1 (Key security). TANDEM protects the use of the
user’s key. No entity other than the user is able to use the
user’s key. Even if the user’s device is compromised, the user
can maintain this property by blocking the key at the TANDEM
server. Thereafter, the attacker cannot further use her key. We
formalize this property in Game 1 in Section VI.
Any solution that recomputes the full user’s key on
the user’s device, e.g., by deriving it from a user-entered
passphrase, does not satisfy this key-security property. In such
a solution, an attacker who compromises the user’s device can
observe the full key when it is used. Thereafter the attacker
can use the key indefinitely, making blocking impossible.
PROPERTY 2 (Key rate-limiting). TANDEM limits the rate of
usage of keys. Users can limit the number of times her key
is used in a given interval of time. We call this interval an
epoch. We formalize this property in Game 2 in Section VI.
The security and rate-limiting properties are related to the
revocation and n-times-use concepts of attribute-based creden-
tials [28], respectively. Yet, they are not the same. Revocation
and n-times-use credentials trust the service providers to block
credentials respectively to block a credential after n uses.
Using TANDEM on the other hand, users need to trust only the
TS, which they choose, to block and rate-limit keys. TANDEM
can ensure this property for a large class of protocols, even if
a system does not rely on credentials.
PROPERTY 3 (Key-use privacy). TANDEM protects the privacy
of key use in transactions. The TANDEM server (TS) cannot
distinguish between two users performing transactions. Even
if the TS colludes with the service provider (SP) it cannot
distinguish users (unless the SP could distinguish the users, in
which case collusion leads to a trivial and unavoidable privacy
breach). We formalize this property in Game 4 in Section VI.
We assume that the TANDEM server is honest with respect
to security. That is, it follows the protocols so as to protect
the security of users’ keys (Property 1) and to ensure that
keys are only used the allowed number of times (Property 2).
Moreover, we trust the TANDEM server to be available, i.e.,
TANDEM does not protect from denial of service. However,
the TANDEM server may be malicious with respect to privacy:
It is interested in breaching the privacy of the users by trying
to learn which keys and services they use (Property 3).
Why naı¨ve solutions do not work. Consider an approach in
which a user naı¨vely secret-shares her key with the TANDEM
server. When she needs to run a threshold-cryptographic
protocol, the user authenticates to the TS, the TS recognizes
the user, retrieves its share of the user’s key, and executes the
TCP together with the user. This scheme offers key security
(Property 1): The TS alone cannot use the user’s key, and
if an attacker compromises the user’s device, the user can
authenticate to the TS and request it to block her key. This
scheme also provides key rate limitation (Property 2): the TS
can observe when a user accesses her key. Hence, it can
easily enforce a limit on the number of times the key is
used. However, since the user is identified while using the
key for a TCP, the scheme does not achieve key-use privacy
(Property 3).
The lack of key-use privacy has further implications when
the interactions between the user and the SP are anonymous
(e.g., showing an anonymous credential). The SP can collude
with the TS to learn the user’s identity, exploiting the fact
that there is a strong correlation between the time when the
authenticated user interacts with the TS, and when the anony-
mous user interacts with the SP. Thus, for every anonymous
transaction with the SP, the anonymity set of the user is
reduced to the authenticated users interacting with the TS
around the transaction time. This attack has been used in the
early days of Tor to identify users and hidden services [48],
[49]. The attack relies solely on time correlation between
accesses. Therefore, the attack cannot be prevented by making
the messages seen by the TS and the SP during the TCP
cryptographically unlinkable [21].
There are two straightforward approaches to prevent time-
correlation attacks: introducing delays and introducing dummy
requests. These solutions are, however, difficult to use in
practice. To significantly increase the anonymity set for users,
operations may need to be delayed for a long time. This rules
out applications that require short delays, such as showing
an anonymous credential or performing a payment. Dummy
traffic not only imposes an overhead on users and the TS,
but it is widely known that generating dummy actions that
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Fig. 1: TANDEM process: after registration, a user can
authenticate herself and obtain key-share tokens, which can
later be used anonymously to execute a TCP (the user and
SP run protocol P). The user can block her keys at any time.
Inputs are shown above the arrows, outputs below.
are indistinguishable from real activity is very difficult [50],
[51]—especially because it is unrealistic that users would
be always online so that their devices could produce such
requests.
B. TANDEM at a Glance
We now provide a high-level overview of how users can
use the TANDEM server to perform threshold-cryptographic
protocols in a privacy-preserving way, see Fig. 1. We assume
that users can use an anonymous communication channel [52],
[53] to communicate with the TANDEM server (TS) and service
providers (SPs) to protect their privacy at the network layer.
Registration. First, users register with the TS using the
RegisterUser protocol. During registration, the user and TS
jointly compute long-term shares xU and xS of a long-term key
x appropriate for the threshold-cryptographic protocols they
seek to run later. The user obtains credentials to authenticate
when obtaining a token (e.g., a password) and also a means to
block her keys (e.g., a passphrase); she stores the latter outside
her device.
Obtain Token. Key-share tokens enable the user to anony-
mously use her key later (see below). To obtain a token, the
user runs the ObtainKeyShareToken protocol with the TS. First,
the user authenticates herself to the TS. Then, the user and
the TS construct a one-time-use key-share token, containing a
randomized version of the TS’s key share xS . At this stage,
the TS can limit the number of tokens it provides the user,
thus limiting how often the user can use her key.
Key-share tokens may seem similar to passwords: both
unlock functionality. However, unlike passwords, key-share
tokens can be verified and used without knowing the user’s
identity. Moreover, key-share tokens contain a randomized
key share x˜S essential for the TCP. Hence, TANDEM cannot
be replaced by a password-hardening service [46], [47]. The
randomized key shares contained in the tokens also distinguish
the tokens from traditional eCash tokens [54], [18], [19].
Using Keys. After obtaining tokens, a user can run threshold-
cryptographic protocols with the TS. First, the user and the
TS use the token to derive fresh shares x˜U and x˜S by running
the GenShares protocol. The new share x˜S cannot be linked
to the long-term share xS , thus it does not reveal the user’s
identity to the TS. The user and the TS use the fresh shares x˜U
and x˜S as input to the threshold-cryptographic protocol TCP,
allowing the user to use her key in the cryptographic protocol
P with the service provider.
The TS never communicates directly with service providers,
but only via the user. Therefore, the use of TANDEM can
remain invisible to the service provider, i.e., users can use
TANDEM without the SP’s knowledge or consent.
Blocking keys. Whenever a user wants to block her key,
she requests the TS to block her key by using the Block-
Share protocol with her blocking means (e.g., the passphrase).
Thereafter, unused tokens become invalid, and no new tokens
can be obtained (not even by an adversary that knows the
authentication credential used to obtain tokens). Hence, the
user’s key cannot be used anymore.
Preventing Time Correlation. When obtaining tokens, the
user is authenticated. Hence, to preserve privacy, the actions
of obtaining and using tokens must be uncorrelated, i.e., tokens
should not be obtained right before usage. To avoid correlation,
the user can configure her device to obtain tokens at random
times or at regular times (e.g., every night) such that tokens
are always available. The user can authenticate herself to the
device at those times, or automate the process by storing her
authentication credential on the device. Note that the user’s
key can still be blocked at the TS if an attacker learns this
authentication credential.
Here we show an example time line of registration (r),
obtaining tokens (oi), using tokens (si), and blocking the key
(b) events:
time
r o1 o2 o3s1 s2 b
This example illustrates that obtain and use events do not
necessarily follow each other, but can be interleaved. As a
result, the timing of these events needs not to be correlated.
The token o3, unused before the key is blocked by b, cannot
be used after time b.
In Section V-B we explain why private information retrieval
is not a suitable alternative to decouple obtaining and using of
key shares, and how TANDEM outperforms generic alternatives
based on secure multi-party computation.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES
Let ` be a security parameter. Throughout this paper, G is a
cyclic group of prime order p (of 2` bits) generated by g. We
write Zp for the integers modulo p. We use a cryptographic
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp that maps strings to integers
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modulo p. We write a ∈R A to denote that a is chosen
uniformly at random from the set A. Furthermore, we write
[n] to denote the set {0, . . . , n− 1}.
For reference, Table II in Section V summarizes the notation
used by TANDEM’s building blocks, and Table III in Section V
explains frequently-used symbols in TANDEM.
A. Cryptographic Building Blocks
TANDEM relies on a couple of cryptographic building
blocks. First, we use an additive homomorphic encryption
scheme given by the algorithms E+pk,D
+
sk with plaintext space
ZN (i.e., integers modulo N ) and space of randomizers R. We
write c = E+pk(m;κ) to denote the homomorphic encryption of
the message m ∈ ZN using randomness κ ∈ R. The scheme
is additively homomorphic, so
E+pk(m1;κ1)·E+pk(m2;κ2) = E+pk(m1+m2 (mod N);κ1κ2).
Our proof of concept uses Joye and Libert’s encryption
scheme [55], but Paillier’s scheme [56] would also work.
Second, TANDEM uses a CPA secure encryption scheme
Epkid ,Dskid with plaintext space G such as ElGamal [57],
that allows simple verifiable encryption.
Third, TANDEM uses two computationally hiding and bind-
ing commitment schemes. First, by Commit(m, r) we denote
a commitment function that takes a message m ∈ Zp and a
randomizer r ∈ Zp. Analogously, we define Commit((m1, . . . ,
mk), r) to commit to a tuple of messages. We instantiate this
scheme using Pedersen’s commitments [58], because it enables
users to obtain a blind signature on the tuple (m1, . . . ,mk).
However, any other commitment scheme with these properties
suffices as well.
Second, we denote by ∆ = ExtCommit(m, r) with m ∈
{0, 1}∗, r ∈ {0, 1}2` an extractable commitment scheme. That
is, in our security reductions, we can extract the input m used
to create a commitment ∆. For example, the instantiation
ExtCommit(m, r) = H(m‖r) is extractable in the random
oracle model.
B. Threshold-Cryptographic Protocols
In this paper, we focus on cryptographic protocols run
between a user and a service provider, e.g., showing a creden-
tial to an SP or spending an electronic coin. The threshold-
cryptographic version of such a protocol splits the user’s key
x and the user’s side of the original protocol in two parts, run
by different parties. Each party operates on a secret-share of
the user’s key. Security of the threshold-cryptographic protocol
(TCP) ensures that a large enough subset of shares (two in the
case of two parties) are required to complete the protocol.
We consider TCPs where the user’s side of the protocol is
distributed between the user and the TS. After registration,
the user and the TS hold the key shares xU and xS of x ,
respectively. After running GenShares, the user and the TS
hold the fresh key shares x˜U and x˜S . They then run the TCP
protocol, which we denote as:
P(inSP )↔ TCP.U(x˜U , inU )↔ TCP.TS(x˜S ), (1)
where the SP, the user and the TS respectively run the
interactive programs P, TCP.U and TCP.TS. The user mediates
all interactions between the service provider and the TS. The
user and the SP take extra inputs needed for the execution
of the target cryptographic protocol denoted as inU and inSP .
For simplicity, we denote the complete protocol from (1) by
TCP(x˜U , x˜S , inU , inSP ).
TANDEM can only enhance the privacy (Property 3) of
certain TCPs. We formalize the condition that these TCPs
should satisfy. To avoid that the TS can recognize the user
based on the shares input to the TCP, we randomize the
long-term secret shares. Thus, we require that TCPs enhanced
with TANDEM still function with randomized key shares. In
addition, our privacy-friendly GenShares protocol requires this
randomization to be linear.
For simplicity, we assume that the user’s secret x ∈ Zp
for some field Zp of prime order p (e.g., corresponding to
the group G we defined above). We note, however, that our
constructions can be modified to settings with unknown order
arising from RSA assumptions. Formally, we require the TCP
to be linearly randomizable:
DEFINITION 1. Let xU , xS ∈ Zp be secret shares of the user’s
secret x . Then, we say that the TCP is linearly randomizable if
for all δ we have that (1) if TCP(xU , xS , inU , inSP ) completes
successfully, then so does TCP(xU − δ, xS + δ, inU , inSP ), and
(2) xS + δ is independent from xS .
The first condition implies that the original secret sharing
(xU , xS ) and the randomized secret sharing (xU − δ, xS + δ)
must share the same secret, whereas the second implies that
the TS cannot recognize the user from the randomized secret
share alone.
Security and privacy properties of TCPs. To ensure that a
TCP with TANDEM satisfies the security properties (Property 1
and Property 2) we require that the TCP itself is secure. That
is, if the TS no longer uses its share xS to run its part of
the TCP, then no malicious user can successfully complete
the TCP with the SP. We formalize this notion in Game 3 in
Section VI.
To ensure that a TCP with TANDEM satisfies the privacy
property (Property 3) we require that the TCP itself offers
privacy with respect to the TS respectively the TS and the SP.
That is, if the TS runs its part of the TCP using a randomized
key-share as input, then the TS respectively the TS and the SP
cannot recognize the user. We formalize this notion in Game 5
in Section VI.
V. TANDEM
In this section, we present a construction that enables
anonymous users to use their keys with the TS without the
TS learning which key is being accessed. It uses homomorphic
encryption to decouple the action of accessing the user’s long-
term key-share xS at the TANDEM server from its subsequent
use in the threshold-cryptographic protocols. Thus, it prevents
time-correlation attacks.
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Initially, the TS generates a private-public key pair (sk, pk)
for an additively homomorphic encryption scheme (see Sec-
tion IV). The TS publishes the public key pk. Upon reg-
istration with the TS, a user receives xS = E+pk(xS)—a
homomorphic encryption of the TS’s key-share xS . Because
the ciphertext xS is encrypted against the TS’ key, the user
does not learn anything about the TS’ share xS .
When the user wants to use her key, she produces a
randomized version of the TS’ key-share xS . To produce
this randomization, she picks a large δ and computes c =
xS ·E+pk(δ) = E+pk(xS + δ). On her side, she randomizes her
key as x˜U = xU − δ (mod p). Then, she sends c to the TS
via an anonymous channel. The TS decrypts c to recover its
key for the threshold cryptographic protocol, x˜S = xS + δ
(mod p). It is easy to see that a linear TCP with randomized
shares completes successfully, because x˜S + x˜U = xU + xS
(mod p). Because c is randomized, the TS can no longer
recognize its share xS , effectively decoupling this action from
the key-share generation.
In this approach, however, the TS cannot block or rate-limit
keys. We present below a construction for one-time-use key-
share tokens containing signed and randomized ciphertexts
like c that enables blocking and rate-limiting while preserving
users’ privacy.
A. One-time-use Key-share Tokens
To construct a token the user picks a large δ and homomor-
phically computes c = xS · E+pk(δ), a randomized encryption
of the TS’ key share. Then, she sends a commitment to c to the
TS, together with a proof that the committed c was constructed
by additively randomizing xS . This proof is needed to enable
secure blocking as we explain below. The user engages with
the TS to obtain a blind signature σ on c. The signature σ is
only known to the user at this stage. The user stores the token
τ = (σ, c) and the randomizer δ.
To run a threshold-cryptographic protocol the user anony-
mously contacts the TS and sends her key-share token τ =
(σ, c). The TS checks the signature and makes sure the token
was not used before. Then, the TS recovers the randomized
key-share x˜S = D+sk(c) (mod p) = xS + δ (mod p) and uses
it as the key for the threshold cryptographic protocol. The
user, on the other hand, uses x˜U = xU − δ (mod p) as the
key. As in the previous case, because c is fully randomized,
the TS cannot leverage it to identify users. Moreover, as σ is
a blind signature on c the TS cannot use σ or c to link the
token creation to the token use.
When a user asks the TS to block her key, the TS no
longer creates key-share tokens for this user (we explain how
the TS blocks unspent tokens below). This prevents attackers
from further running threshold-cryptographic protocols, even
if they corrupt the user’s device. For the blocking of keys to
be effective, attackers must not be able to construct key-share
tokens for a blocked user. Here is where the proof becomes
handy that c is constructed as xS ·E+pk(δ), where xS belongs
to the current user. Suppose that we omit the proof. Then,
an attacker controlling an unblocked user can create tokens
TABLE II: Notation and cryptographic building blocks used
by TANDEM.
Symbol Interpretation
[n] The set {0, . . . , n− 1}
` The security parameter
G, g, p Cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of order p
Additively homomorphic encryption scheme
E+pk(m; r) Encrypt message m ∈ ZN with randomizer r ∈ R
D+sk(c) Decrypt ciphertext c
N Size of additive plaintext domain
R Space of randomizers
CPA secure verifiable encryption scheme
Epkid (m) Encrypt message m ∈ G
Dskid (c) Decrypt ciphertext c
Commitment schemes and hash function
Commit(m, r) Commit to m ∈ Zp (or a tuple of messages) with
randomizer r ∈ Zp
ExtCommit(m, r) Commit to m ∈ {0, 1}∗ with randomizer r ∈
{0, 1}2`
H(s) Hash function from s ∈ {0, 1}∗ to Zp
TABLE III: Notation in TANDEM protocols
Symbol Interpretation
D Disclose subset in cut-and-choose construction
δ, δi Randomizers of key shares
id Token identifier
k Token security parameter
`δ Length of randomizers δi in bits
x Long-term secret key for a user
pk, sk Public-private key-pair of TS
pkid, skid Public-private key-pair of the user U
p Order of the group G
xU Long-term key share held by the user
xS Long-term key share held by the TS
xS Homomorphic encryption of xS
x˜U User’s key share output by GenShares
x˜S TS’ key share output by GenShares
 The current epoch
σ Blind signature of the TS
for a corrupted blocked user. The attacker uses the unblocked
user’s account to make the TS blindly sign encrypted key
shares for the blocked user. The attacker can use the resulting
token to use the blocked user’s key, defeating the purpose of
TANDEM. Verifying which user’s key share is embedded into
the ciphertext blindly signed by the TS prevents the attack.
Finally, since tokens are one-use only, to restrict the number
of times a user can use her key (rate-limit), the TS just signs
a limited number of key-share tokens per-epoch per-user.
Registering Users. When a user first registers at the TS, the
TS computes a key-share xS for that user, and sends her
an encrypted version xS = E+pk(xS ). To ensure that the TS
cannot hide an identifier in higher-order bits of xS that are not
randomized by the user in the remainder of the protocol the
TS proves that the plaintext xS is in the correct range.
PROTOCOL 1. The RegisterUser protocol is run between a user
and the TS, and proceeds as follows.
1) The user U and the TS generate secret shares xU ∈R Zp
and xS ∈R Zp, respectively. The user also generates a
public-private key-pair (pkid, skid) for encrypting token
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identifiers and sends pkid to the TS. The user needs the
secret key skid to block unspent tokens if needed. We
assume that the user stores skid externally so that it is
available even after she loses her device. We propose that
the user’s device generates skid based on a high-entropy
passphrase (such as a Diceware passphrase2), so that users
can write down this string as a stand-in for skid.
2) The TS picks κ ∈R R, computes xS = E+pk(xS ;κ) and
sends xS to the user. Moreover, the TS sends a range
proof to the user that xS is constructed correctly, i.e.,
that
D+sk(xS) ∈ [0, p). (2)
See Appendix B for how to instantiate this proof.
3) The TS records (xS , xS , pkid) for this user, and marks
this user as active. The user stores (xU , xS , pkid) on her
device, and stores skid externally.
Obtain a Key-share Token. First, the user needs to randomize
the ciphertext xS . However, it seems difficult to prove directly,
for example in zero-knowledge, that the randomized ciphertext
produced by the user is of the correct form. Therefore, we use
a standard cut-and-choose approach [59], [54] to allow the
TS to check that the encrypted key share it is blindly signing
is correct with overwhelming probability. The user constructs
2k randomized ciphertexts ci = xS · E+pk(δi;κi), and sends
commitments Ci to them to the TS. The TS then asks the user
to open a subset D of cardinality k, so that the TS can verify
that these k ciphertexts were correctly formed. Having checked
all opened ciphertexts, the TS blindly signs the remaining k
ciphertexts. By nature of the cut-and-choose protocol at least
one of the remaining ciphertexts is a correct randomization of
xS with high probability.
Let `δ = dlog pe + ` + log k + 2 be the bit-length of the
randomizer such as δ. This size ensures that the k unopened
xS + δi values statistically hide xS . Furthermore, we require
that N > 3 · 2`δ to ensure no overflows occur.
In our security proofs, see Section VI, we show that an
adversary cannot learn anything useful about xS despite seeing
xS and having access to the TS. We reduce to the CPA
security of the homomorphic encryption scheme to show that
an adversary cannot use xS to learn something about xS .
However, in the reduction to CPA security, we cannot decrypt
ciphertexts. Yet, in the GenShares protocol, the TS must
decrypt a randomized version of xS to recover the randomized
key share. To allow us to correctly answer GenShares queries
without decrypting ciphertexts, the user additionally creates a
commitment ∆i to δi and κi. In our proof of security, we use
the extractability of ExtCommit(·, ·) to extract δi from these
commitments, thus allowing us to answer GenShares queries
without actually decrypting.
Using an additively homomorphic CCA2 secure encryption
scheme would obviate the need for the extractable commit-
ments ∆i, simplifying the scheme. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge no additively homomorphic CCA2 secure
2http://world.std.com/∼reinhold/diceware.html
scheme exists. The RCCA scheme by Canetti et al. [60] is not
homomorphic, the schemes by Prabhakaran and Rosulek [61]
are multiplicatively homomorphic, and the fully homomorphic
scheme by Lai et al. [62] is not CCA2 secure.
PROTOCOL 2. The ObtainKeyShareToken protocol is run be-
tween a user and the TS.
1) The user recovers (xU , xS , pkid) from storage, and au-
thenticates to the TS. The TS aborts if this user exceeded
the rate-limit for the current epoch, was banned, or was
blocked. Otherwise, the TS looks up the user’s record
(xS , xS , pkid).
2) The TS randomly chooses a subset D ⊂ {1, . . . , 2k} of
cardinality k of indices of ciphertexts that it will check at
step 5. The TS commits to D by picking θ ∈R {0, 1}2`
and sending ∆ = ExtCommit(D, θ) to the user.
3) The user picks randomizers δ1, . . . , δ2k ∈ {0, 1}`δ to
randomize the encrypted secret share xS , randomizers
κ1, . . . , κ2k ∈ R to create ciphertexts, and randomizers
r1, . . . , r2k ∈ Zp and ξ1, . . . , ξ2k ∈ {0, 1}2` for the
commitments and sets:
ci = xS ·E+pk(δi;κi)
Ci = Commit(H(ci), ri)
∆i = ExtCommit((δi, κi), ξi),
(3)
for i = 1, . . . , 2k. Finally, she sends the commitments
C1, . . . , C2k and ∆1, . . . ,∆2k to the TS. Note that the
commitments Ci and ∆i are computationally binding and
hiding.
4) The TS opens the commitment ∆ by sending the subset
D and the randomizer θ to the user. The user checks that
∆ = ExtCommit(D, θ), and aborts if the check fails.
5) The user opens the requested commitments by sending
(ci, δi, κi, ri, ξi)i∈D to the TS. The TS checks that all
disclosed values are constructed as per equation (3) and
that δi < 2`δ . If any check fails, the TS bans the user.
6) Next, the user generates a token identifier id ∈R Zp at
random. Let H = {i1, . . . , ik} = {1, . . . , 2k} \ D be
the set of indices of unopened commitments. For the
blind signature the user picks r ∈R Zp and creates a
commitment
C = Commit((id, ,H(ci1), . . . ,H(cik)), r)
to the unopened ciphertexts, the epoch  and id. Then, she
encrypts the token identifier id as id = Epkid(id), and
sends C and id to the TS. Finally, she proves in zero-
knowledge to the TS that id encrypts the token identifier
id in C against her own public key pkid and that C
commits to the unopened ciphertexts, i.e.,
PK{((ci, ri, ηi)i∈H, id, r) : id = Epkid(id)∧
∀i ∈ H [Ci = Commit(ηi, ri)]∧
C = Commit((id, , ηi1 , . . . , ηik), r)},
where ηi = H(ci). The TS checks this proof.
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7) If any check fails, the TS bans the user and aborts
the protocol. If all checks pass, the TS runs a blind
signature protocol with the user on the commitment
C so that the user obtains a signature σ on the tuple
(id, ,H(ci1), . . . ,H(cik)). The user stores τ = (σ, , id,
(ci, κi, δi)i∈H). The TS stores id.
The following lemma states that even if a user is malicious,
at least one of the ciphertexts ci must be correctly formed.
(See Appendix A for the proof.)
Lemma 1. Consider a token τ = (σ, , id, (ci, κi, δi)i=1,...,k)
obtained using the above protocol by a (potentially malicious)
user U with corresponding TS key-share xS . Let ∆1, . . . ,∆k
be the corresponding set of commitments used during the
obtain step. Then, with probability 1− 1/(2kk ) there exists an
index i∗, and randomizers δ∗ < 2`δ , κ∗, and ξ∗ such that:
ci∗ = E
+
pk(xS + δ
∗;κ∗)
∆i∗ = ExtCommit((δ
∗, κ∗), ξ∗).
Using a Key-share Token. When using a token, the user
sends the tuple (id, , ci1 , . . . , cik) and the signature σ to the
TS, and provides an index j of the ciphertext cj that the TS
should decrypt. The TS uses the corresponding plaintext as the
key in the threshold-cryptographic protocol. We know from
Lemma 1 that at least one index i∗ exists such that ci∗ is
correctly formed. Key-share tokens resemble Chaum et al.’s
e-cash tokens [54]. For the e-cash tokens it suffices if some
indices are correct, in TANDEM, however, the user chooses
the index j, and we must thus ensure that cj in particular is
correct. To enable the TS to check this, the user also reveals
the differences γi = δj − δi for all i = 1, . . . , k. If these
differences are correct then because ci∗ is a randomization of
xS , so must be cj .
PROTOCOL 3. The GenShares protocol is run between an
anonymous user and the TS.
1) The user a token τ = (σ, , id, (ci, κi, δi)i=1,...,k) as input
and connects to the TS via an anonymous channel. She
sends (id, , c1, . . . , ck) and the blind signature σ.
2) Next, the user finds j such that δj ≥ δi for all i and
computes γi = δj − δi ≥ 0 and νi = κj · κ−1i such that
cj = ci ·E+pk(γi; νi) (4)
for i = 1, . . . , k. Finally she sends j, and γ1, . . . , γk,
ν1, . . . , νk to the TS.
3) The TS verifies that the γis and νis satisfy equation (4),
that σ is a correct signature on (id, ,H(c1), . . . ,H(ck)),
token id was not blocked,  corresponds to the current
epoch, and that γi < 2`δ . The TS aborts if any check
fails.
4) The TS decrypts cj to compute x˜S = D+sk(cj) (mod p).
5) The user calculates her key share x˜U as:
x˜U ≡ xU − δj (mod p)
Using Lemma 1, we can show that the decrypted element
cj must also be of the right form. (See Appendix A for the
proof.)
Lemma 2. If revealed token (id, , c1, . . . , ck, ) with j,
γ1, . . . , γk and ν1, . . . , νk satisfies equation (4), then with
probability 1− 1/(2kk ) there exists δ < 2`δ+1 such that
D+sk(cj) = xS + δ
where xS is the TS key-share for the corresponding user.
The range proof in registration is essential. The range proof
in equation (2) in the RegisterUser protocol ensures that the
plaintext xS = D+sk(xS) is small compared to the randomizers
δi. As a result, the randomized ciphertexts ci statistically hide
xS . It is not sufficient to skip the range proof and instead
choose the randomizers δi from the full plaintext domain [N ]
to hide xS . Without the range proof, the TS can construct
tokens that it can later recognize by exploiting the fact that a
large xS results in a reduction modulo N . More precisely, the
TS can set xS of its target user somewhat large, so that xS +
δj > N (with a non-negligible probability). The user believes
that the TS derives xS + δj (mod p) (because she believes no
modular reduction took place) and compensates accordingly.
However, the TS actually derives x˜S = (xS + δj mod N)
(mod p) = xS +δj−(N mod p). To test if the current token
is from its target user, the TS adds (N mod p) to x˜S . If the
guess was correct, the TCP completes correctly, otherwise the
protocol fails. This allows the TS to detect specific users.
Blocking the Key. To block her key, the user runs the
BlockShare protocol with TS to ensure no new key-share
tokens are created for her, and that all her unspent tokens
are blocked.
PROTOCOL 4. The BlockShare protocol is run by a user and
the TS. The user takes as input her long-term key skid (which
she recorded outside her device). The user authenticates to the
TS (possibly using skid). The TS marks the user as blocked, so
that it will no longer issue new tokens. Then they continue as
follows to invalidate unspent tokens. The TS sends a list of all
encrypted token identifiers id1, . . . , idt that the user obtained
in this epoch. The user looks up a list of all spent token
identifiers (see below). The user then uses skid to decrypt
id1, . . . , idt and sends the decrypted token identifiers that have
not yet been spent to the TS. The TS will then block all tokens
with these identifiers.
Since we assume the TS is honest with respect to blocking,
the TS accurately provides the list of encrypted token identi-
fiers. In the ObtainKeyShareToken protocol, the user verifiably
encrypts the token identifier id. As a result, even if the user’s
device is corrupted, the TS stores a correct encryption id of
id, so the above procedure blocks all unspent tokens.
In the unlikely case that a user cannot recover the identifiers,
the attacker can nevertheless use the TS only a limited number
of times, as the attacker is still subject to the rate-limit.
List of spent tokens. The TS is malicious with respect to
privacy. So, it might try to trick the user into revealing the
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identifiers of tokens she has already spent (thus revealing that
these tokens were hers). In particular, the TS is not trusted
to provide an accurate list of spent tokens. Therefore, we
propose that users externally store spent token identifiers, so
that they have a reliable record. Alternatively, the TS can keep
a verifiable log of spent tokens by appending spent token
identifiers to a public append-only log (users must then verify
that each spent token identifier is in fact added to the log).
Users then use this log as a record of spent tokens. Finally, if
epochs are short, and users are willing to risk revealing their
actions in the current epoch, they can also use a list provided
by the TS. If the TS cheats, users reveal at most their actions
within the most recent epoch when they block their keys.
B. Alternative constructions
An alternative method to construct tokens could be to use
an authenticated encryption scheme that the user and the TS
evaluate using secure multi-party computation [63]. The server
inputs its key share xS while the user inputs the randomizer
δ. The user’s output is the authenticated encryption of xS + δ
for the TS’s symmetric key which serves as token. To ensure
that the TS cannot recognize this token, the protocol should
resist malicious servers and the circuit should validate the TS’s
input (i.e., that they are always the same). Even though recent
secure two-party computation protocols that are secure against
a malicious server boast impressive performance [64], they still
require at least one order of magnitude more computational
power as well as more bandwidth than our custom scheme.
Another simple alternative construction is to let users re-
trieve xS = Enc(xS ) using private information retrieval (PIR)
via an anonymous channel—the user must still hide her iden-
tity. Then, users randomize xS similarly to our construction,
and the TS decrypts the ciphertext to recover xS + δ, which it
then uses in the TCP. To enable blocking of keys, the TS
needs to frequently refresh its encryption keys, effectively
invalidating previously retrieved ciphertexts xS . This simple
protocol, however, has serious drawbacks. First, blocking is
only enforced upon key refreshing, thus the timespan when
compromised keys can be used depends on the refreshing
schedule of the TS. Second, because the encryption of xS for
the current period can be randomized as often as the user wants
(and the use of PIR precludes record-keeping), this scheme
cannot provide rate-limiting. Third, because the TS acts as
a decryption oracle for a homomorphic encryption scheme,
which is only CPA secure, proving security in this setting
requires very strong and non-standard assumptions.
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF TANDEM
In this section we formalize the security and privacy prop-
erties offered by TANDEM. We refer to the appendix for the
complete security and privacy proofs.
A. Security of TANDEM
We capture the security of TANDEM using the following
game. It models that if the user’s key is compromised (e.g.,
her device is stolen), the user can block the use of her key,
provided that the TANDEM server remains honest.
GAME 1. The TANDEM security game is between a challenger
controlling the TS and the SP, and an adversary controlling up
to n users. The adversary’s goal is to complete a threshold-
cryptographic protocol for a blocked user.
Setup phase The challenger sets up the TS and the SP. The
challenger runs RegisterUser with the adversary for each
of the n users the adversary controls.
Query phase During the query phase, the adversary can ask
the TS to run the RegisterUser, ObtainKeyShareToken
and BlockShare protocols with users controlled by the
adversary. Moreover, the adversary can make RunTCP
queries to the challenger. In response, the TS first runs
the GenShares protocol with the user (controlled by the
adversary), followed by a run of the TCP protocol.
Selection phase At some point the adversary outputs the
identifier of a blocked user U∗ on which it wants to be
challenged later. To allow the challenger to confirm that
all unspent tokens are blocked (to prevent trivial wins),
the adversary also outputs the long term secret skid of
user U∗. The challenger checks skid against the recorded
public key pkid and then blocks all tokens of user U∗
using skid. The adversary loses if skid is not correct.
Second query phase The adversary can keep asking the TS
to run RegisterUser, ObtainKeyShareToken, BlockShare
protocols. The adversary can also make RunTCP queries
as before (however, following the protocols the TS will
not allow ObtainKeyShareToken queries of blocked users).
Challenge phase Finally, upon request of the adversary, the
challenger acts as SP in the TCP protocol. At the same
time, the adversary may still make queries and run
protocols as in the previous phase. The adversary wins if
it successfully completes the TCP with the SP on behalf
of the blocked user U∗. To prevent trivial wins, this TCP
protocol must be completable only by user U∗.3
In this game, all users are automatically corrupted right from
the moment they start the registration protocol. This models
the notion that users can even be blocked if the adversary
is present right from the start, and also implies that honest
users—which are only corrupted later—can still be blocked.
GAME 2. The TANDEM rate-limiting game is identical to the
TANDEM security game, except that in the selection phase the
adversary outputs a rate-limited user (i.e., a user who is not
allowed to obtain more tokens in this epoch).
Of course, to have security using TANDEM, the TCP itself
must be secure. Hence, we require that even if a malicious user
has interacted many times with the TS, she cannot use her key
3One option is that the TCP protocol identifies the user. So for example,
for the attribute-based credential TCPs, this means that the showing protocol
must disclose an attribute that identifies U∗. Another option is to make sure
that user U∗ is the only user who can successfully complete the protocol,
e.g., by revoking all other credentials.
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when she does not have access to the TS. We formalize this
using the following game.
GAME 3. The TCP security game is between a challenger
controlling the TS and the SP and the adversary controlling a
malicious user.
Setup phase During the setup phase, the adversary generates
xU ∈R Zp, whereas the TS, controlled by the challenger,
generates xS ∈R Zp.
Query phase In the query phase, the adversary can make
TCP(δ) queries to request that the TS runs TCP.TS(xS+δ)
with the user. The adversary is responsible for running
TCP.U. Optionally, the adversary-controlled user can com-
municate with the challenger-controlled SP running P()
as well.
Challenge phase In the challenge phase, the adversary is
not allowed to make TCP queries. Instead, it interacts
solely with the challenger-controlled SP running P(). The
adversary wins if the SP accepts.
Theorem 1. No PPT adversary can win the TANDEM security
game or the TANDEM rate-limiting game with non-negligible
probability, provided that the TCP is secure (i.e., no PPT
adversary can win the TCP security game).
Proof sketch. We prove the security of the scheme by reducing
it to the TCP security property. First, we show how to
run GenShares without decrypting ciphertexts. During the
ObtainKeyShareToken protocol, we model hash functions as
random oracles to allow us to extract the token identifier id
from the proof of knowledge in step 6, and the unopened
randomizers δi from the extractable commitments ∆i in step
3. Hence, during GenShares we can identify the user, and thus
the corresponding key share xS , as well as the randomizer δj
(with overwhelming probability, using Lemma 2).
Knowing xS and δj we no longer need to decrypt ciphertexts
to run GenShares, therefore, we can use the CPA security
of the homomorphic encryption scheme to replace the initial
ciphertext xS = E+pk(xS ) for the challenge user by xS =
E+pk(0) an encryption of 0. During GenShares we add xS to
compensate. (To enable the reduction to CPA, we simulate the
range proof in step 2 of RegisterUser.)
Finally, we answer all queries for the challenge user using
the TCP security oracle. Hence, a break of the TANDEM
security game results in a break of the TCP security game.
See Appendix C for the full proof.
B. Privacy of TANDEM
The following game models that TANDEM provides privacy
for users. A malicious TANDEM server cannot distinguish
between two honest users performing a transaction using the
TANDEM server even if it colludes with the service provider,
provided that the service provider on its own cannot distin-
guish transactions by these two honest users. The following
privacy game asks the TS to recognize users for which it earlier
issued a key-share token.
GAME 4. The TANDEM privacy game with colluding SP is
between a challenger, who controls two honest users U0 and
U1, and an adversary A who controls the TS and the SP.
Setup phase The adversary A outputs the number of key-
share tokens nT each honest user should obtain. The
adversary is responsible for setting up the SP and the
TS, i.e., it should publish a public key pk. Next, the
honest users U0 and U1 interact with the adversary-
controlled TS to obtain nT key-share tokens each. First,
U0 runs ObtainKeyShareToken nT times to obtain tokens
τ0,1, . . . , τ0,nT . Then, U1 runs the obtain protocol nT
times to obtain tokens τ1,1, . . . , τ1,nT .
Query phase During the query phase, the adversary can make
RunTCP(Ui, j, inU ) queries to request that user Ui uses
token τi,j and then runs the TCP with input inU . If
i ∈ {0, 1} and user Ui did not use token τi,j before,
then user Ui, controlled by the challenger, first runs
GenShares with the TS using token τi,j and then runs
TCP.U(inU ) with the TS and the SP (running TCP.TS and
P respectively).
Challenge phase At some point, the adversary outputs a pair
of token indices (i0, i1) for user U0 and U1 respectively
on which it wants to be challenged. Let τ0 = τ0,i0 and
τ1 = τ1,i1 be the corresponding tokens. The adversary
loses if either token τ0 or τ1 has been used before. Then,
the challenger picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and proceeds as
if the adversary first made a RunTCP(Ub, τb) query and
then a RunTCP(U1−b, τ1−b) query.
Guess phase The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b. The
adversary wins if b′ = b.
The privacy game models the fact that there is no time
correlation between when tokens are obtained by a user, and
when they are spent by a user. At the same time, the adversary
has full control over the TS and the SP, so this game also
models the fact that the TS and the SP can correlate events
that they see.
Since the SP is controlled by the adversary, the TCP must
ensure privacy with respect to the SP and the TS, if all that
the TS sees are randomized secret shares. We formalize this
in the following game.
GAME 5. The TCP privacy game with colluding SP is between
a challenger controlling two honest users U0 and U1 and an
adversary A, controlling the TS and the SP.
Setup The adversary publishes the TS public key and is
responsible for setting up the SP. The challenger sets
up its users. First, user U0 generates x0,U ∈R Zp while
the TS generates x0,S ∈R Zp, then U1 and TS similarly
generate x1,U and x1,S . Finally, the TS sends x0,S and
x1,S to users U0 and U1 respectively.
Queries Adversary A can make RunTCP(i, inU ) queries, to
request Ui to run the TCP protocol using input inU with
the TS and the SP (both controlled by A). In the first
step, the user picks δ ∈R Zp and sends the randomized
secret-share x˜S = xi,S + δ (mod p) to the TS. The user
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then sets x˜U = xi,U − δ and runs TCP.U(x˜U , inU ) with
the TS and the SP running TCP.TS and P respectively.
Challenge Adversary A outputs an input inU . Challenger
picks a bit b ∈R {0, 1}. Then the challenger acts as
if A first made a RunTCP(b, inU ) query, and then a
RunTCP(1− b, inU ) query.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess b′ for b,A wins if b = b′.
TANDEM also offers privacy for users against the TS alone.
That is, even if the service provider can identify users, the
TS cannot observe their key-usage patterns as long it does not
collude with the service provider. (If the SP can identify users,
then so can a coalition of the TS and the SP, so we exclude
this case to prevent a trivial win.) We model this situation as
a variant of the previous two games.
DEFINITION 2. The TANDEM privacy game with honest SP
and the TCP privacy game with honest SP are as in Game 4
and Game 5 above, however, the challenger controls the SP.
The adversary can interact with the SP as a normal user.
Theorem 2. No PPT adversary can win the TANDEM privacy
game with colluding SP (respectively the TANDEM privacy
game with honest SP) with probability non-negligibly better
than 1/2, provided that the TCP is privacy-friendly (i.e., no
PPT adversary can win the TCP privacy game with colluding
SP respectively the TCP privacy game with honest SP).
Proof sketch. We first argue that we can remove all identify-
ing information from the key-share tokens of the challenge
users. First, we extract the server’s key-shares x0,S and x1,S
from the proof of knowledge in step 2 of the RegisterUser
protocol. Then we simulate the proof of knowledge in step
6 of ObtainKeyShareToken, replace the ciphertext id by the
encryption of zero (using the CPA security of the ElGamal
encryption scheme), extract the subset D so that we can
send random commitments Ci,∆i for i 6∈ D (because the
commitment schemes are computationally hiding), and finally,
we set the unrevealed ciphertexts ci = E+pk(δi, κi) for i 6∈ D.
None of these changes are detectable by the adversary during
ObtainKeyShareToken.
To use tokens as requested by the adversary, the challenge
users add xi,S to their long-term share xU to compensate for
the changes made so that GenShares completes successfully.
Moreover, because the randomizers δi statistically hide xS ,
the adversary cannot detect the final change to the ciphertexts
during GenShares.
Therefore, by the blindness of the signature scheme, we can
swap tokens between the users and still simulate protocols per-
fectly. Therefore, any adversary that can then still distinguish
users must break the security of the TCP privacy game (with a
colluding SP or with a honest SP). To extract secrets from the
proofs and commitments, and to make the final reduction to
TCP privacy, we model hash functions as random oracles.
See Appendix D for the full proof.
VII. SECURING PROTOCOLS WITH TANDEM
Recall that to use TANDEM to protect the private key in
a cryptographic scheme we must convert the protocols into
linearly randomizable threshold-cryptographic protocols.
For this composition to be secure, the threshold-cryptogra-
phic protocols must satisfy the natural security definition (see
Game 3). For this composition to be private, i.e., so that the
TANDEM server alone respectively by colluding with the SP
cannot identify the user, the threshold-cryptographic protocols
must additionally be private (see Game 5).
Many traditional threshold-cryptographic schemes already
satisfy these requirements. Threshold variants of Schnorr [14]
and RSA signatures [15] as well as ElGamal-based [16], [17]
and RSA encryption [15] schemes rely on Shamir secret-
sharing and are thus linearly randomizable. Moreover, the
threshold protocols are private, i.e., the server-side protocols
for signing and decrypting, respectively, operate solely on the
secret-share and the common input, the message or ciphertext.
Threshold-cryptographic versions of electronic cash
schemes [18], [19] and attribute-based credential (ABC)
schemes [20], [21], [22], [23] can also be used with
TANDEM. For some of these, the threshold-cryptographic
versions already exist [21]. For the others, the threshold-
cryptographic versions of the zero-knowledge proofs on which
these schemes are based must be created. As an example, we
now show how convert the BBS+ ABC scheme [20] into a
TANDEM-suitable threshold-cryptographic scheme.
A. The use-case of ABCs
Attribute-based credentials can be conceptualized as dig-
ital equivalents to classic documents like passports, driver’s
license, student cards, etc. The owner of a credential can selec-
tively disclose any subset of attributes to a service provider in
such a way that the the validity of the disclosed attributes can
be validated. In many ABC systems credentials are unlinkable,
that is, users are anonymous within the set of users having the
same disclosed attributes.
To bind credentials to a user, and to ensure that only the
owner can operate with them, credentials contain the user’s
secret key. Typically, all credentials of a user contain the same
secret key. When credentials are stored on insecure platforms
such as smart phones or personal computers TANDEM can be
used to strengthen the security of the secret key. This ensures
that valuable credentials cannot be abused, and can be blocked,
while preserving users’ privacy.
To use ABCs with TANDEM we need to convert the pro-
tocols for issuing and verifying credentials into threshold-
cryptographic alternatives that are secure, private, and linearly
randomizable. During issuance, the issuer (taking the place
of the service provider in Section III) provides the user with
a credential bound to the user’s secret key. The issuer does
not learn the user’s secret key. During verification, a user
authenticates to a service provider by selectively disclosing
attributes from her ABCs.
In typical ABC schemes, these two protocols rely heavily
on zero-knowledge proofs over the user’s secret key. In the
11
TS User Issuer
x˜S ∈ Zp, B0 x˜U ∈ Zp, s′, g, B,B0, B1 skI
xˆS ∈R Zp xˆU , sˆ′ ∈R Zp
uS = B
xˆS
0
uS uU = B
xˆU
0
U˜ = Bsˆ
′ · uU · uS U˜
c c c ∈R Zp
rS = xˆS + c · x˜S rS rs′ = sˆ′ + c · s′
rU = xˆU + c · x˜U
r = rU + rS
rs′ , r U˜
?
= U−c ·Brs′ ·Br0
Fig. 2: Full details of the proof of knowledge of the user’s commitment U = Bs
′
BxU0 B
xS
0 in the BBS+ TCP issuance protocol.
The TANDEM server only knows x˜S and the user knows x˜U and the randomness s′ (recall x˜S and x˜U are the respective outputs
of the GenShares protocol). The TS effectively creates a zero-knowledge proof of knowing x˜S .
remainder of this section, we show how these non-threshold
protocols for BBS+ credentials [20] can be converted to
threshold-cryptographic versions suitable for TANDEM.
BBS+ credentials are anonymous credentials built from
BBS+ signatures [20]. BBS+ signatures operate in a pairing
setting and rely on discrete-logarithm based assumptions. Let
(G1,G2) be a bilinear group pair, both of prime order p,
generated by g and h respectively. The pairing is given by
eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT where GT , also of order p, is generated
by eˆ(g, h). Let l be the number of attributes. In the BBS+
credential scheme, an issuer randomly chooses generators
B,B0, .., Bl ∈R G1, picks a private key skI ∈R Zp, and
computes w = hskI . The issuer’s public key is pkI =
(w,B,B0, .., Bl).
Obtaining a credential. Attribute-based credentials contain
the user’s secret key as an attribute. For simplicity, we describe
the TANDEM BBS+ issuance and showing protocols below
with two attributes: the secret key x and an issuer-determined
attribute a1. To obtain a credential, the user (and the TANDEM
server) run the following TCP version of the issuance protocol
with the issuer. The issuance protocol is run jointly by the
user, TS, and an issuer. Let x˜U and x˜S be the two shares
of the user’s secret key x = x˜U + x˜S that are held by the
user and the TS respectively after running GenShares. The
user first commits to her secret key x , to allow the issuer to
blindly sign it. As we share the user’s secret key between the
user and the TS, they both have to participate in creating the
commitment. First, the user sends B0 to the TS so that it can
compute Bx˜S0 before sending back to the user. Then the user
and the TS create a commitment U = Bs
′
Bx˜U0 B
x˜S
0 = B
s′Bx0
where s′ ∈R Zp. To prove to the issuer that U is well-formed,
the user and the TS construct the proof
PK{(x , s′) : U = Bs′Bx0 }. (5)
Fig. 2 shows how to construct this proof. If this proof of
knowledge verifies, the issuer randomly generates s′′, e ∈R Zp
and calculates
A =
(
gBs
′′
UBa11
) 1
e+skI ∈ G1
and the tuple (A, e, s′′) to the user. The user calculates s =
s′ + s′′ and stores the credential σ = (A, e, s).
Showing a credential. After the issuance protocol, the user
can show the credential to a service provider to get access to a
service or a resource. Again we convert the showing protocol
into a TCP that uses the TANDEM server.
In the showing protocol, the user proves the possession of
a credential σ = (A, e, s) over her key x and the attribute a1.
To show she possesses such a credential, while hiding her key
and disclosing her attribute, she proves in zero-knowledge that
eˆ(A, hew) = eˆ(gBsBx0B
a1
1 , h). (6)
To prove the validity of this equation in zero-knowledge,
without revealing any of the values A, e, s (that would make
the user linkable), we follow the approach by Au et al. [20].
Let g1, g2 be two extra generators in G1. First, the user creates
a commitment C1 = Agr12 to A, where r1 is a randomizer
chosen from Zp by the user. The user then commits to her
randomizer as well using C2 = gr11 g
r2
2 where r2 ∈R Zp. The
user sends these commitments to the service provider. These
commitments perfectly hide the value of A. Finally, she and
the TS engage in the following zero-knowledge proof with the
service provider:
PK
{
(r1, r2, α1, α2, e, x , s) : C2 = g
r1
1 g
r2
2 ∧Ce2 = gα11 gα22 ∧
eˆ(C1, w) · eˆ(C1, h)e = eˆ(g, h)eˆ(B, h)seˆ(B0,h)x ·
eˆ(B1, h)
a1 eˆ(g2, w)
r1 eˆ(g2, h)
α1
}
to prove that she indeed posseses the signature over the hidden
and the disclosed attributes and that equation (6) is satisfied.
In the proof, α1 = er1 and α2 = er2. The user can easily
generate the proofs for the first two conjuncts. Only the third
conjuct contains the user’s secret key x of which the user
only has a secret share. Thus, the user has to contact the TS
to construct this part of the proof. This proof is just a proof of
representation, like in equation 5, albeit a bit more complex.
As a result, a very similar construction as in Fig. 2 allows the
user and the TS to jointly compute this proof.
12
Security and privacy of the TCPs. These TCPs satisfy
the TCP security and privacy notions defined in Section VI.
For security (see Game 3), note that the TS computes zero-
knowledge proofs of knowing x˜S . A malicious user learns
nothing about x˜S (thus nor xS ) as a result of the zero-
knowledge property. Hence, the TCP showing and issuance
protocols satisfy the TCP security property.
For privacy (see Game 5), the TS operates on a fully
randomized key x˜S , so the TS cannot distinguish users based
on the key if the SP is honest. The indistinguishability property
of the credential scheme guarantees that the TS cannot distin-
guish users based on the resulting showing proof by colluding
with the SP either. Thus, the TCP showing protocol is private
for both honest and colluding SPs.
B. Rate-limiting in ABCs
Anonymous users can use the cover of privacy to misbehave,
negatively impacting the system. ABC systems are not exempt
from such misbehavior. Suppose, for example, that a user
shares her “I am older than 18” credential with many under-
aged users who do not hold such a credential. Then, those
under-aged users can incorrectly convince service providers
that they are over 18 years of age. If this happens often, service
providers can no longer rely on these credentials to verify that
a user is older than 18.
To limit such misbehavior, ABCs could benefit from rate-
limiting. One method to limit abuse is to rate-limit credentials
by ensuring that credentials can only be used a limited number
of times. For instance, solutions such as n-times anonymous
credentials [28] use custom cryptographic techniques to con-
struct a special type of ABC that can be used only a limited
number of times.
TANDEM can achieve a similar type of rate-limiting without
modifying the underlying cryptographic construction of ABCs.
To rate-limit use of a system, the TS enforces a per-user and
per-epoch limit q on the number of tokens it issues per user
and per epoch. As a result, no credential can be shown more
than q times per epoch. This approach limits all credentials
associated to a user’s key. If desired, TANDEM can equally be
applied on a per-credential basis.
This rate-limiting strategy requires that all users use TAN-
DEM. However, recall that the SPs (issuers and verifiers)
cannot detect the use of TANDEM, allowing users to forego
sharing their keys with the TS, thus avoiding the rate limit.
To enable the TS to enforce a rate-limit on all credentials,
issuers must only issue credentials on keys that are shared
with the TS.
A small change to the threshold-cryptographic version of the
issuance protocol enables the issuer to confirm that users use
TANDEM. To signal its involvement, the TS signs its proof
(uS , c, rS) and sends the signature σ to the user. The user
forwards the messages uS , rS and σ from the TS to the issuer
together with its own messages uU , rs′ and rU . The issuer,
rather than the user, combines the proofs and verifies them.
Moreover, the issuer checks the signature σ. If the signature
and proofs are correct, then the user’s key was shared with
the TS and the issuer signs the credential.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate TANDEM’s computational and
bandwidth cost. We use an attribute-based credential instan-
tiation as a case study and compare the performance when
using no key protection, traditional threshold-cryptographic
schemes, and TANDEM.
TANDEM consists of four protocols: RegisterUser, Obtain-
KeyShareToken, GenShares, and BlockShare. We implemented
in C the time-critical protocols, ObtainKeyShareToken and
GenShares.4 We used Pedersen commitments [58] as commit-
ment scheme, and BBS+ credentials [20] to construct the blind
signature. We use the RELIC cryptographic library to imple-
ment them [65].5 We use a recent implementation [66] of Joye
and Libert’s additive homomorphic encryption scheme [55]
for our protocols. We set the modulus size to 2048 bits and
the plaintext space to 394 bits, such that N > 3 · 2`δ for
k ≤ 85. With this setting, encrypting a single 394 bits plaintext
takes 0.9 ms whereas it takes 24.2 ms to decrypt a ciphertext.
We also experimented with an optimized implementation6
of Paillier’s encryption scheme [56], but our experiments
show that Joye and Libert’s scheme gives better performance.
Finally, we use ElGamal’s encryption scheme [57] to encrypt
token identifiers.
We empirically measure performance on a single core of
an Intel i7-7700 running at 3.6 GHz. Smart phones and tablets
generally have slower processors. Yet, we believe that given
our measurements, TANDEM’s performance would be practical
on these devices.
Obtaining a token. We first justify our choices for the value
of the security parameters k in our experiments. Our security
analysis shows that an attacker can break TANDEM’s security
property by constructing a key-share token for a blocked
user with probability
(
2k
k
)−1
. Hence, k = 42 gives 80 bits
of security, and k = 66 gives 128 bits security. However,
ObtainKeyShareToken is an interactive protocol. The success
probability of an attacker is limited by how often the TS lets
the attacker try to construct a malicious token rather than by
the adversary’s computational power. Because the TS bans
users trying to construct malicious tokens, one can choose a
smaller k in practice. In a system with 100 000 users, k = 20
ensures that the probability that an attacker (corrupting all
users) can at least once use any blocked key is less than 10−6.
Fig. 3 shows the computing time (without communication)
for the ObtainKeyShareToken protocol at the user (black) and
server (blue) for different values of the parameter k. The
homomorphic encryption scheme—creating the ciphertexts
(user), and checking a subset of these (TS)—dominates the
computational cost. Our experiments reveal that the timing
4The code will be available upon publication.
5We set up RELIC to use a BLS curve over a 381 bits field. This setup
ensures 128 bits security, while the group order remains 255 bits.
6https://github.com/mcornejo/libpaillier
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Fig. 3: ObtainKeyShareToken protocol computing time at the
user (black) and the server side (blue), and GenShares pro-
tocol computation time at the server side (red) for increasing
difficulty levels k.
variance accross executions is negligible. The bandwidth cost
is low. For a security level of k = 20, the user sends about
26 KiB and receives less than 200 bytes.
Using the key. On the user side running GenShares is very
cheap. Even for k = 60 the user requires less than 5 ms.
In terms of bandwidth the user just needs to send 12 KiB
for k = 20 and 36 KiB for k = 60. We show the server’s
computational cost for recovering the TS key-share from the
token in Fig. 3. For a reasonable security level of k = 20, the
server computational overhead is around 50 ms. The sending
of the token in the GenShares protocol can be combined with
the request to start the TCP resulting in no extra latency on top
of the delay incurred by the Tor network [53] (1–2 s to send a
small and receive amount of data on a fresh circuit7). Note that
the circuit creation and GenShares can be run preemptively,
thereby reducing the user-perceived delay.
Given the above measurements, a modern 4-core server can
participate in approximately 50 TCPs per second (not counting
the cost of the application-dependent TCP itself), i.e., serve
3 000 users per minute, requiring about 15 Mbit/s incoming
bandwidth.
RegisterUser and BlockShare. These protocols are run few
times (only upon registration and for blocking) and are thus not
critical for scalability. We estimate the cost for RegisterUser
to be well below a second for both the user and the TS (given
its similarity with the ObtainKeyShareToken and GenShares
protocols, and that the cost of the range proof is around
500 ms). In BlockShare the ElGamal decryption the token
identifiers dominates the run-time cost, we estimate it to be in
the order of seconds for thousands of tokens.
Comparison. Table IV compares the computational cost of
creating a single BBS+ disclosure proof with 5 hidden at-
tributes without key protection, using a traditional TCP, and
using a TANDEM-augmented TCP configured with k = 20.
Without a TCP, the credential showing is very fast and, as
there is no party involved in the use of the key, the showing of
the credential is perfectly private. However, it is not possible
7As reported by https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf.html, visited July 6,
2018.
TABLE IV: Comparison of computational cost and properties
between not using a TCP, using a traditional TCP, and using
a TCP with TANDEM (k = 20).
No TCP Traditional TCP TCP + TANDEM
Obtain Token
User - - 59 ms
Server - - 32 ms
Run Protocol
User 5 ms 5 ms 5 + 4 ms
Server - 1 ms 1 + 54 ms
Key blocking × X X
Rate limiting × X X
Privacy X × X
to perform key blocking nor limit the key-usage unless specific
credentials (e.g. [28]) are used. When introducing a traditional
TCP, the overhead is minimal (only 1 ms at the server side)
and key blocking and rate limiting are possible, at the cost
of privacy. TANDEM provides the three properties. Without
taking into account the ObtainKeyShareToken operation that
happens offline, the user’s overhead is negligible (4 ms), and
well below a second (54 ms) for the server. In all cases, the cost
of Tandem’s cryptographic operations are very small compared
to Tor’s network cost.
IX. CONCLUSION
Protecting cryptographic keys is imperative to maintain the
security of cryptographic protocols. As users’ devices are most
of the time insecure, the community has turned to threshold-
cryptographic protocols to strengthen the security of keys.
When run with a central server, however, these protocols raise
privacy concerns. In this paper, we have proposed TANDEM, a
provably secure scheme that, when composed with threshold-
cryptographic protocols, provides privacy-preserving access
to the keys. TANDEM also enables users to block her keys
and rate-limit their usage, in ways that previous work could
not handle. Our proof-of-concept implementation of TANDEM
shows that for reasonable security parameters TANDEM’s
protocols run in less than 60 ms, hence being suitable for use
in practice.
TANDEM is particularly suited for privacy-friendly applica-
tions such as eCash and ABCs because it retains their inherent
privacy properties. Yet, TANDEM can be used to strengthen a
wide variety of primitives, including signature and encryption
schemes, as long as they can be transformed into linearly-
randomizable threshold protocols. Using attribute-based cre-
dentials we have shown that deriving such a threshold protocol
can be done with standard techniques, and that thereafter
adding TANDEM is straightforward.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Hern, “Stagefright: new Android vulnerability dubbed
‘heartbleed for mobile’,” The Guardian, 2015. [On-
line]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/28/
stagefright-android-vulnerability-heartbleed-mobile
[2] V. van der Veen, Y. Fratantonio, M. Lindorfer, D. Gruss, C. Maurice,
G. Vigna, H. Bos, K. Razavi, and C. Giuffrida, “Drammer: Deterministic
Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms,” in CCS, 2016.
14
[3] Kim Zetter, WIRED magazine, “How the top 5 PC makers open your
laptop to hackers,” https://www.wired.com/2016/05/2036876/, 2016.
[4] M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, T. Prescher, W. Haas, S. Mangard,
P. Kocher, D. Genkin, Y. Yarom, and M. Hamburg, “Meltdown,” ArXiv
e-prints, Jan 2018.
[5] J. Ekberg, K. Kostiainen, and N. Asokan, “The Untapped Potential of
Trusted Execution Environments on Mobile Devices,” in S&P, 2014.
[6] C. Marforio, N. Karapanos, C. Soriente, K. Kostiainen, and S. Capkun,
“Secure enrollment and practical migration for mobile trusted execution
environments,” in SPSM, 2013.
[7] R. S. Sandhu and X. Zhang, “Peer-to-peer access control architecture
using trusted computing technology,” in SACMAT, 2005.
[8] B. McGillion, T. Dettenborn, T. Nyman, and N. Asokan, “Open-TEE -
An Open Virtual Trusted Execution Environment,” in TrustCom, 2015.
[9] Android security website, “Developing third party applications with
Trusty TEE,” https://source.android.com/security/trusty/#third-party
trusty applications, 2017.
[10] S. Das, A. Dingman, and L. J. Camp, “Why Johnny Doesn’t Use Two
Factor A Two-Phase Usability Study of the FIDO U2FSecurity Key,” in
FC, 2018.
[11] L. T. A. N. Branda˜o, N. Christin, G. Danezis, and anonymous, “Toward
mending two nation-scale brokered identification systems,” PoPETs,
2015.
[12] H. A. Jawaheri, M. A. Sabah, Y. Boshmaf, and A. Erbad, “When A small
leak sinks A great ship: Deanonymizing tor hidden service users through
bitcoin transactions analysis,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.07501, 2018.
[13] S. Goldfeder, H. A. Kalodner, D. Reisman, and A. Narayanan, “When
the cookie meets the blockchain: Privacy risks of web payments via
cryptocurrencies,” PoPETs, 2018.
[14] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, “Secure Distributed
Key Generation for Discrete-Log Based Cryptosystems,” J. Cryptology,
2007.
[15] V. Shoup, “Practical threshold signatures,” in EUROCRYPT, 2000.
[16] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms,” in CRYPTO, 1984.
[17] V. Shoup and R. Gennaro, “Securing Threshold Cryptosystems against
Chosen Ciphertext Attack,” J. Cryptology, 2002.
[18] J. Camenisch, S. Hohenberger, and A. Lysyanskaya, “Compact e-cash,”
in EUROCRYPT, 2005.
[19] I. Miers, C. Garman, M. Green, and A. D. Rubin, “Zerocoin: Anonymous
distributed e-cash from bitcoin,” in S&P, 2013.
[20] M. H. Au, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, “Constant-Size Dynamic k-TAA,” in
SCN, 2006.
[21] S. A. Brands, Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certifi-
cates: building in privacy. MIT Press, 2000.
[22] J. Camenisch and E. V. Herreweghen, “Design and Implementation of
the Idemix Anonymous Credential System,” in CCS, 2002.
[23] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya, “A Signature Scheme with Efficient
Protocols,” in SCN, 2002.
[24] P. D. MacKenzie and M. K. Reiter, “Two-party generation of DSA
signatures,” Int. J. Inf. Sec., 2004.
[25] R. Gennaro, S. Goldfeder, and A. Narayanan, “Threshold-optimal
DSA/ECDSA signatures and an application to bitcoin wallet security,”
in ACNS, 2016.
[26] M. H. Au, P. P. Tsang, and A. Kapadia, “PEREA: Practical TTP-free
Revocation of Repeatedly Misbehaving Anonymous Users,” TISSEC,
2011.
[27] P. P. Tsang, M. H. Au, A. Kapadia, and S. W. Smith, “BLAC: Revoking
Repeatedly Misbehaving Anonymous Users without Relying on TTPs,”
TISSEC, 2010.
[28] J. Camenisch, S. Hohenberger, M. Kohlweiss, A. Lysyanskaya, and
M. Meyerovich, “How to Win the Clone Wars: Efficient Periodic n-
times Anonymous Authentication,” in CCS, 2006.
[29] C. J. Mitchell, “What is trusted computing?” in Trusted Computing,
2005, vol. 6.
[30] Y. Desmedt, “Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Con-
cept,” in CRYPTO, 1987.
[31] C. Boyd, “Digital multisignatures,” Cryptography and Coding, 1989.
[32] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel, “Shared Generation of Authenticators and
Signatures (Extended Abstract),” in CRYPTO, 1991.
[33] T. Rabin, “A Simplified Approach to Threshold and Proactive RSA,” in
CRYPTO, 1998.
[34] R. Gennaro, T. Rabin, S. Jarecki, and H. Krawczyk, “Robust and
Efficient Sharing of RSA Functions,” J. of Cryptology, 2000.
[35] J. F. Almansa, I. Damga˚rd, and J. B. Nielsen, “Simplified Threshold-
RSA with Adaptive and Proactive Security,” in EUROCRYPT, 2006.
[36] R. Peeters, S. Nikova, and B. Preneel, “Practical RSA threshold decryp-
tion for things that think,” in WISSec 2008, 2008.
[37] C. Hazay, G. L. Mikkelsen, T. Rabin, and T. Toft, “Efficient RSA Key
Generation and Threshold Paillier in the Two-Party Setting,” in CT-RSA,
2012.
[38] E. Atwater and U. Hengartner, “Shatter: Using Threshold Cryptography
to Protect Single Users with Multiple Devices,” in WISEC, 2016.
[39] M. Keller, G. L. Mikkelsen, and A. Rupp, “Efficient Threshold Zero-
Knowledge with Applications to User-Centric Protocols,” in ICITS,
2012.
[40] P. D. MacKenzie and M. K. Reiter, “Networked Cryptographic Devices
Resilient to Capture,” in S&P, 2001.
[41] J. Camenisch, A. Lehmann, G. Neven, and K. Samelin, “Virtual Smart
Cards: How to Sign with a Password and a Server,” in SCN, 2016.
[42] D. Boneh, X. Ding, G. Tsudik, and C. Wong, “A Method for Fast
Revocation of Public Key Certificates and Security Capabilities,” in
USENIX, 2001.
[43] D. Boneh, X. Ding, and G. Tsudik, “Fine-grained control of security
capabilities,” TOIT, 2004.
[44] B. Libert and J. Quisquater, “Efficient revocation and threshold pairing-
based cryptosystems,” in PODC, 2003.
[45] A. Buldas, A. Ju¨rgenson, A. Kalu, and M. Oruaas, “Server-supported
RSA signatures for mobile devices,” in ESORICS, 2017.
[46] A. Everspaugh, R. Chatterjee, S. Scott, A. Juels, and T. Ristenpart, “The
pythia PRF service,” in USENIX, 2015.
[47] J. Camenisch, A. Lehmann, and G. Neven, “Optimal distributed pass-
word verification,” in CCS, 2015.
[48] T. G. Abbott, K. J. Lai, M. R. Lieberman, and E. C. Price, “Browser-
Based Attacks on Tor,” in PETS, 2007.
[49] L. Øverlier and P. F. Syverson, “Locating Hidden Servers,” in S&P,
2006.
[50] E. Balsa, C. Troncoso, and C. Dı´az, “OB-PWS: Obfuscation-Based
Private Web Search,” in S&P, 2012.
[51] R. Chow and P. Golle, “Faking Contextual Data for Fun, Profit, and
Privacy,” in WPES, 2009.
[52] A. M. Piotrowska, J. Hayes, T. Elahi, S. Meiser, and G. Danezis, “The
Loopix Anonymity System,” in USENIX, 2017.
[53] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. F. Syverson, “Tor: The second-
generation onion router,” in USENIX, 2004.
[54] D. Chaum, A. Fiat, and M. Naor, “Untraceable electronic cash,” in
CRYPTO ’88.
[55] M. Joye and B. Libert, “Efficient Cryptosystems from 2k-th Power
Residue Symbols,” in EUROCRYPT, 2013.
[56] P. Paillier, “Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree
Residuosity Classes,” in EUROCRYPT, 1999.
[57] T. ElGamal, “A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based
on Discrete Logarithms,” Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 31, no. 4, 1985.
[58] T. P. Pedersen, “Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifi-
able secret sharing,” in CRYPTO, 1991.
[59] G. Brassard, D. Chaum, and C. Cre´peau, “Minimum disclosure proofs
of knowledge,” J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 1988.
[60] R. Canetti, H. Krawczyk, and J. B. Nielsen, “Relaxing chosen-ciphertext
security,” in CRYPTO, 2003.
[61] M. Prabhakaran and M. Rosulek, “Homomorphic encryption with CCA
security,” in ICALP, 2008.
[62] J. Lai, R. H. Deng, C. Ma, K. Sakurai, and J. Weng, “CCA-Secure
Keyed-Fully Homomorphic Encryption,” in PKC, 2016.
[63] A. C. Yao, “How to Generate and Exchange Secrets (Extended Ab-
stract),” in FOCS, 1986.
[64] X. Wang, S. Ranellucci, and J. Katz, “Authenticated garbling and
efficient maliciously secure two-party computation,” in SIGSAC, 2017.
[65] D. F. Aranha and C. P. L. Gouveˆa, “RELIC is an Efficient Library for
Cryptography,” https://github.com/relic-toolkit/relic.
[66] M. Barbosa, D. Catalano, and D. Fiore, “Labeled Homomorphic Encryp-
tion: Scalable and Privacy-Preserving Processing of Outsourced Data,”
in ESORICS, 2017.
[67] M. Bellare and S. Goldwasser, “Verifiable partial key escrow,” in CCS,
1997.
[68] A. Juels, M. Luby, and R. Ostrovsky, “Security of blind digital signatures
(extended abstract),” in CRYPTO, 1997.
[69] D. Schro¨der and D. Unruh, “Security of blind signatures revisited,” J.
of Cryptol., 2017.
15
APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1. Whenever a ciphertext ci is selected by
the TS for opening, the TS checks that it and the corresponding
randomizers κi, δi, ξi, and ri are as in equation (3) and that
δi < 2
`δ , and hence as stated in the theorem.
Since the TS checks k tuples, every adversary needs to
include at least k correct tuples in its set of 2k tuples. If no
index i∗ exists for the remaining tuples, then all k of them
were incorrectly formed. The probability that none of these k
bad tuples were selected during the cut and choose protocol
is 1/
(
2k
k
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1 we know that with prob-
ability 1− 1/(2kk ) there exists i∗ and δ∗, xS such that
D+sk(ci∗) = xS + δ
∗
Let cj = E+pk(α). From equation (4) we know that:
cj = ci∗ ·E+pk(γi∗ ;κi∗)
By decrypting we find that α = xS + δ∗ + γi∗ (mod N).
Moreover, δ∗ < 2`δ (by Lemma 1), xS < p < 2`δ (by
construction) and γi∗ < 2`δ as checked by the TS. Since
`δ = dlog pe + ` + log k + 2 and N > 3 · 2`δ , we have
that α = xS + δ∗ + γi∗ as integers, and thus cj is a proper
randomization, with randomizer δ∗ + γi∗ < 2`δ+1, of xS as
well.
APPENDIX B
CONSTRUCTING CORRECTNESS PROOF OF xS
In this section we describe the details of the range proof
of D+sk(xS) in the RegisterUser protocol. The range proof
ensures that the TS cannot recognize anonymous users by
constructing specially crafted versions of xS as explained
earlier. When using a homomorphic encryption scheme that
supports zero-knowledge proofs, such as Paillier’s encryption
scheme, we can use standard techniques, see for example the
bitwise technique by Bellare and Goldwasser [67], to prove
that D+sk(xS) is at most 2` bits (which is a sufficient proxy
for p in our schemes).
In our implementation, however, we use Joye and Lib-
ert’s encryption scheme which does not readily allow zero-
knowledge proofs. Therefore, we instantiate the range proof
using a construction that consists of two parts.
I) The TS constructs a commitment C to xS using a
commitment scheme whose message space is at least as
big as the plaintext space of the encryption scheme. The
TS then uses a traditional zero-knowledge proof to show
that the value xS committed in C is smaller than p.
II) Next, the TS uses a cut-and-choose technique to show
that C commits to D+sk(xS) = xS .
The details are as follows. The user and TS take xS as
input. The TS takes as private input xS and the randomizer
κ used to construct xS . Let G be a cyclic group of order p
generated by g such that p > N (recall, N is the size of the
plaintext domain of the homomorphic encryption scheme). Let
h be another generator of G such that the discrete logarithm
of h with respect to g is unknown. We use this group to create
a commitment scheme with a large message space.
The details of the first step are as follows. Part I is
represented by step 1, whereas part II is represented by the
cut-and-choose technique in steps 2 – 7. If at any step a
verification fails, the protocol is aborted. The cut-and-choose
technique is very similar to the construction we use in the
ObtainKeyShareToken and GenShares protocols. Let k be the
difficulty level of the cut-and-choose protocol.
1) The TS creates a non-interactive proof that the commit-
ment C contains key-share xS of the correct size:
PK{(xS , r) : C = gxShr ∧ xS ∈ [0, p)}. (7)
and sends this proof to the user. This proof can be
implemented using a standard technique like the bitwise
commitment technique of Bellare and Goldwasser [67].
The user checks the correctness of the proof.
2) The user randomly chooses a subset D ⊂ {1, . . . , 2k} of
cardinality k. She commits to D by picking θ ∈R {0, 1}`
and sending ∆ = ExtCommit(D, θ) to the TS.
3) The TS picks randomizers δ1, . . . , δ2k ∈R {0, 1}`δ
and κ1, . . . , κ2k ∈R R to construct ciphertexts, and
r, r1, . . . , r2k ∈ Zp to create commitments. Then, the TS
computes a commitment C = gxSh
r
and sets:
ci = E
+
pk(δi;κi)
Ci = g
δih
ri (8)
for i = 1, . . . , 2k. Finally, the TS sends the cipher-
texts c1, . . . , c2k and commitments C,C1, . . . , C2k to
the user. The commitments are computationally binding
and information theoretically hiding. (Contrary to the
ObtainKeyShareToken protocol, the TS can safely send
the ciphertexts, because the user cannot decrypt them.)
4) The user sends the subset D and the commitment ran-
domizer θ to the TS.
5) If ∆ = ExtCommit(D, θ), then the TS sends
(δi, κi, ri)i∈D to the user (otherwise, it aborts). The
user verifies that the values ci, Ci for i ∈ D satisfy
equation (8). Moreover, the user checks that δi < 2`δ
for i ∈ D.
6) Next, the TS computes
γi = δi − xS , ρi = ri − r, νi = κiκ−1
for i 6∈ D, and sends them to the user.
7) Finally, the user checks that
ci = xS ·E+pk(γi; νi)
Ci = C · gγihρi
(9)
and that 0 ≤ γi < 2`δ for i 6∈ D, and accepts the proof
if all verifications are correct.
Lemma 3. If the user does not reject in the above protocol,
then with probability 1−1/(2kk ) we have that D+sk(xS) ∈ [0, p)
as required.
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Proof. From the zero-knowledge proof in step 1, we know
that the TS knows an opening α′, r′ of C = gα
′
h
r′
such
that 0 ≤ α′ < p. We complete the proof by showing that
α′ = D+sk(xS).
We continue as per Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. We restate them
here for completeness. First, along the lines of Lemma 1, with
probability 1 − 1/(2kk ) there exists an index i∗ such that the
TS knows an opening δ∗, r∗ such that:
δ∗ = D+sk(ci∗) < 2
`δ
Ci∗ = g
δ∗h
r∗
.
(10)
The user checks that the TS knows an opening for the k pairs
that are opened by the TS in step 4. So, the TS must include
at least k pairs for which it knows a correct opening. Suppose,
for contradiction, that the index i∗ does not exist, i.e., that the
remaining k pairs are incorrect or cannot be opened by the TS.
Since the protocol completed, the user did not detect foul play.
This situation can only occur if the TS correctly guesses the
set D in advance. Since the TS does not learn anything about
D before step 3, the probability that none of the remaining
pairs is correct is 1/
(
2k
k
)
, as required.
Assume now that this index i∗ as required above exists. We
use this to show that C commits to D+sk(c), i.e., that α
′ =
D+sk(c). From equation (9) we know that:
Ci∗ = C · gγi∗hρi∗
so, by using equation (10) and equating exponents, we find that
δ∗ = α′ + γi∗ (mod p). We know from the zero-knowledge
proof that α′ < p and by direct inspection that γ < 2`δ
therefore, the equality holds over the integers as well, and
we have
δ∗ = α′ + γi∗ < 2`δ+1 < N. (11)
From equation (9) we also know that:
ci∗ = xS ·E+pk(γi∗ ; νi∗)
By decrypting and using equation (10) we find that:
δ∗ = D+sk(xS ·E+pk(γi∗ ; νi∗)) = D+sk(xS) + γi∗ (mod N).
Substituting δ∗ from equation (11) and substracting γi∗ shows
that α′ = D+sk(xS) (mod N), and therefore, by size of α
′
and D+sk(xS) < N , that α
′ = D+sk(xS) as required.
In the security proof, we replace xS with the encryption
of 0, so that the adversary who has corrupted a user learns
nothing about xS (except what is revealed as a result of the
threshold-cryptographic protocol). The following lemma states
that we can do so, without the adversary detecting this change.
Lemma 4. TS can simulate the correctness proof given above
such that xS = E+pk(0), provided that the encryption scheme
is CPA secure and the commitment scheme ExtCommit(·, ·) is
extractable. This simulation does not require any knowledge
of how xS was created.
This proof uses a sequence of games that interpolates
between the situation where the RegisterUser protocol is exe-
cuted normally, and the situation, where xS is an encryption
of 0. This game is as in the security game: the adversary
can make RegisterUser, ObtainKeyShareToken, GenShares, and
BlockShare queries. It’s task is to determine if xS is as in the
original protocol, or xS = E+pk(0). In particular:
• Game 0. In Game 0, xS is constructed as per the protocol.
• Game 1. We proceed as in Game 0, but simulate the cut-
and-choose proof in steps 2 – 7 by extracting D.
• Game 2. As in Game 1, but simulate the zero-knowledge
proof in step 1 of the protocol.
• Game 3. As in Game 2, but replace the commitment C
by a random commitment.
• Game 4. As in Game 3, but replace xS with an encryption
of 0.
We show that each pair of consecutive games is indistin-
guishable to a polynomially-bounded adversary. Hence, no
adversary can distinguish Game 0 from Game 4, thus proving
the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. We first show how to simulate the cut-
and-choose proof in steps 2 – 7. The adverary sends a
commitment ∆ to the TS in step 1. We use the extractability
of ExtCommit(·, ·) to recover D from ∆ (for example, using
the random oracle model if it is implemented using a hash-
function).
We change how TS acts in step 3. Let D ⊂ {1, . . . , 2k} be
the subset of cardinality k extracted from ∆. For all i ∈ D the
TS sets ci and Ci as per equation (8). For other elements, i.e.,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k} \ D, the TS generates γ ∈R {0, . . . , 2`δ −
1}, ρ ∈R Zp, ν ∈R R and sets ci and Ci as per equation (9).
In step 4, the adversary reveals D and θ. If ∆ =
ExtCommit(D, θ) then with overwhelming probability, we cor-
rectly extracted D. If we correctly extracted D, the TS can
open the tuples for i ∈ D in step 5 and return γi, ρi, νi for the
other elements. Both satisfy the adversary’s checks in steps 5
and 7.
Games 0 is indistinguishable from Game 1. The simulated
proof can go wrong for two reasons. One, we can fail to
extract the disclose set D, but this can only happen with
negligible probability. Second, the distribution of γis for i 6∈ D
is not completely correct, however, the size of δ ensures that
this difference is statistically hidden from the adversary. So,
from the point of view of the adversary, Games 0 and 1 are
indistinguishable.
In Game 2 we simulate the zero-knowledge proof in step 1.
By construction of the simulator of this proof, the adversary
cannot detect this change.
As a result of the changes we made in Game 1, the answers
of TS do not depend on the opening of C. So, in Game 3
the TS can generate a random commitment C ∈R G. Since
Pedersen’s commitment scheme is information-theoretically
hiding, the adversary cannot detect this change.
In Game 4, the TS sends xS = E+pk(0) to the user instead of
an encryption of the key-share xS . As a result of the changes
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we made in Game 1, the TS can still complete the remaining
part of the protocol.
We claim that the adversary A cannot distinguish Games 3
and 4. Suppose to the contrary that A can distinguish Games
3 and 4. We then show that A can break the CPA security of
the homomorphic encryption scheme.
To do so, we build an adversary B against the CPA security
of the encryption scheme. Recall that B can make a challenge
query on two messages m0 and m1. In our case, B picks
m0 = xS and m1 = 0. Then, its challenger returns a ciphertext
c∗ = E+pk(pk,mb) for some bit b ∈R {0, 1}. Adversary B
needs to guess b.
In RegisterUser queries for the challenge user U∗, adversary
B (which acts as a challenger to A) uses xS = c∗. Clearly,
if b = 0, then B perfectly simulates Game 3. If b = 1, it
perfectly simulates Game 4. Therefore, if A can distinguish
between Games 3 and 4, it can break the CPA security of the
encryption scheme.
APPENDIX C
SECURITY PROOF
In the security proof, the challenger controls the TS and
the adversary tries to attack a user. The security proof is a
sequence of games. In the final game, the challenger simulates
the game using only the TCP oracle of the TCP security game,
without knowing the corresponding TS’ key-share xS . As a
result, any adversary that manages to use the blocked key of
that user must therefore break the security of the underlying
threshold-cryptographic protocol.
We use the following sequence of games:
• Game 0: We play the game as described in the TANDEM
Security game, see Game 1 on page 9.
• Game 1: We change the definition of GenShares. The
challenger simulates the workings of TS but does not
decrypt any ciphertext. Instead, the TS uses the ex-
tractability of ExtCommit(·, ·) and the ∆is (from the corre-
sponding ObtainKeyShareToken protocol) to compute the
plaintext corresponding to cj (without decrypting), which
it uses as x˜S . Finally, the TS constructs the proof of
knowledge of x˜S as before.
• Game 2: We guess the challenge user U∗ and we change
the definition of RegisterUser for this user: we replace
xS = E
+
pk(xS ) by xS = E
+
pk(0).
• Game 3: For all non-challenge users we answer
GenShares queries as in the previous game. For U∗ the
TS simulates the TCP following GenShares using the
TCP security oracle (without knowing xS of U∗).
We then prove the following:
• The adversary cannot distinguish Game 0 from Game 1.
We prove that as long as one of the tuples is as it should
be—and Lemma 1 shows that this is the case with high
probability—then we correctly recover the plaintext of cj
and thus the TS extracts the correct x˜S , and therefore the
TCP is correct as well.
• The adversary cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game
2. We no longer decrypt ciphertexts. Hence, we can use
the CPA security of the encryption scheme to show that
the adversary cannot distinguish Game 1 from Game 2.
More formally, we build a distinguisher that interpolates
between Games 1 and 2. The distinguisher makes a query
for m0 = xS and m1 = 0 to its CPA challenger, and uses
the answer as xS . Lemma 4 shows the adversary cannot
detect this change to RegisterUser. If the CPA challenger
returned an encryption of xS then the distinguisher per-
fectly simulates Game 1, otherwise it simulates Game 2.
We can still answer GenShares queries correctly, since
we no longer need to decrypt any ciphertexts.
• The adversary cannot distinguish Game 2 from Game 3
because the TCP oracle simulates the same protocol.
• Finally, if we have an adversary that can win Game
3, then it breaks the security of the TCP because by
construction the challenger has no new tokens for the
challenge user U∗ (because she is blocked or rate-limited)
in the challenge phase.
Proof of Theorem 1. This proof follows the sequence of
games highlighted above. Let U∗ be the challenge user. We
guess this user. If the guess turns out to be incorrect, we repeat
the reduction with a new guess.
In Game 1 we change how the TS responds to RunTCP
queries, in particular, we change GenShares for the challenge
user U∗. The TS (controlled by the challenger) no longer
decrypts the ciphertext cj revealed in a token, but instead
directly recovers the plaintext using the ∆i values. The TS
then continues as before.
To enable the TS to answer RunTCP queries without de-
crypting, the TS stores some extra values whenever A runs
the ObtainKeyShareToken protocol. Whenever the TS blindly
signs a token, it extracts, id, the token’s identifier (normally,
the TS cannot learn this value). The challenger uses the
extractability of ExtCommit(·, ·) to find inputs δ′i1 , . . . , δ′im
and κ′i1 , . . . , κ
′
im
used to create the unopened commitments
∆i1 , . . . ,∆im . (The adversary might cheat so that not all
∆is are true commitments.) By Lemma 1, m ≥ 1, and
there exists i∗ such that the extracted inputs are correct, i.e.,
δ′i∗ = δi∗ and κ
′
i∗ = κi∗ . The challenger records the tuple
(id, U, (i1, δ
′
i1
, κ′i1), . . . , (im, δ
′
im
, κ′im)) for later use.
We now show how to answer RunTCP queries without
needing to decrypt the ciphertexts. The TS initially follows
the GenShares protocol. At the start of the protocol, A sends
a token (id, c1, . . . , ck) to the TS (run by the challenger)
together with a (blind) signature on it produced by the TS.
Moreover, A provides γ1, . . . , γk and ν1, . . . , νk. The TS then
checks that these values are correct. If not, it aborts. So far,
the challenger follows the protocol.
Now, we start to deviate from the protocol.
The challenger looks up the corresponding tuple
(id, U, (i1, δ
′
i1
, κ′i1), . . . , (im, δ
′
im
, κ′im)) from tokens it
issued. Let xS be the encrypted key share for this user.
We use the values δ′i1 , . . . , δ
′
im
and κ′i1 , . . . , κ
′
im
to find the
plaintext of one of ci1 , . . . , cim and then use this to compute
the plaintext of cj .
18
For i ∈ i1, . . . , im test if:
ci = xS ·E+pk(δ′i, κ′i)
Let (i∗, δ′i∗ , κ
′
i∗) be the tuple that satisfies this equation. By,
Lemma 1 we know that there must exist an index i∗ such that:
ci∗ = xS ·E+pk(δi∗ , κi∗),
∆i∗ = ExtCommit((δi∗ , κi∗), ξ
∗),
so this procedure does indeed find such a tuple (i∗, δ′i∗ , κ
′
i∗).
The plaintext of ci∗ thus is xS + δ′i∗ . If i
∗ = j we are done,
and x˜S = xS + δi∗ (mod p). Otherwise, the plaintext of cj is
xS + δi∗ + γi∗ and therefore x˜S = xS + δ′i∗ + γ
′
i∗ (mod p).
Now that the challenger has derived x˜S it continues with
the TCP as normal. This shows how we can answer RunTCP
queries without needing to decrypt the ciphertexts.
Games 0 and 1 cannot be distinguished by the adversary.
During ObtainKeyShareToken queries, the TS extracts the to-
ken identifier id using rewinding, so this is not detected by the
adversary. By Lemma 1 the index i∗ exists with overwhelming
probability, so the responses of the TS are completely identical
for the RunTCP queries made by the adversary.
In Game 2, we do not send xS = E+pk(xU∗,S) to the adver-
sary when it makes RegisterUser queries for the challenge user
U∗. Instead, we send xS = E+pk(0). During RunTCP queries,
we first extract the plaintext of cj as above, and then add
xU∗,S . The fact that the TS does not need to decrypt cj to
answer RunTCP queries together with Lemma 4 shows that
the adversary cannot detect this change.
In Game 3, we again change how we answer RunTCP
queries for the challenge user U∗. In particular, we will answer
this query without using the corresponding key-share xU∗,S .
Instead, we use the challenge oracle for the TCP security in
the query phase. We proceed as before, to find the plaintext δ
of cj when running GenShares. However, now we use the TCP
challenge oracle to run the TCP by making a TCP(δ mod p)
query. The TANDEM security challenger relays the messages
to the adversary A. After the selection phase, we advance the
TCP security challenger to the challenge phase. Moreover, the
challenge user U∗ cannot obtain new tokens (because U∗ is
either blocked or rate-limited), and all old tokens have been
invalidated, so we no longer need access to the TCP oracle to
answer queries. Finally, in the challenge phase, we relay the
messages to the TCP challenger. Then, if adversary A wins
Game 3, it breaks the TCP security of the underlying TCP.
Since we assumed this cannot happen, the TANDEM scheme is
secure as well. The only difference between Game 2 and Game
3 is that we use the TCP oracle to run the TCP. However, since
the TCP oracle uses to correct randomized key, this change is
indistinguishable to the adversary.
APPENDIX D
PRIVACY PROOF
In our privacy proof, we reduce an attacker against privacy
to an attacker on the underlying blind signature scheme (which
we instantiate using the BBS+ credential scheme). In terms of
attribute-based credentials, this game is precisely the issuer-
unlinkability game. This game is the standard blind-signature
game [68], [69].
GAME 6. The blind-signature game is between a challenger
controlling an honest user U and an adversary controlling the
signer.
Setup At the start of the game, A publishes the public key
of the signer and outputs all other necessary public
parameters.
Challenge At some point, the adversary outputs two messages
m0 and m1 on which it wants to be challenged. The chal-
lenger picks a bit b ∈R {0, 1} and proceeds as follows.
(1) User U engages with the signer to obtain a signature
on mb. Let σb be the corresponding signature. (2) User
U engages with the signer to obtain a signature on m1−b.
Let σ1−b be the corresponding signature. If either signing
protocol fails, set σ0 = σ1 = ⊥. Finally, the challenger
sends (m0, σ0) and (m1, σ1) to the adversary.
Guess Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ of b. The
adversary wins if b′ = b.
If no adversary can win this game then the signer can
recognize neither the signature nor the message.
The computationally hiding commitments in the Obtain-
KeyShareToken protocol ensure that the TS learns nothing
about the unrevealed ciphertexts ci which it then blindly
signs—again without learning anything about the message.
So, when the user runs GenShares and thereby reveals these
ciphertexts, they cannot be directly correlated to a corre-
sponding run of ObtainKeyShareToken. Moreover, the plaintext
corresponding to the ciphertexts ci are fully randomized, so
that these too do not reveal anything about the user with which
the TS is currently interacting.
The privacy proof folows a sequence of games. Throughout
we use a guess i0, i1 for the challenge tokens. If this guess
turns out to be incorrect when the adversary makes it challenge
query, we abort and try again. We first use a sequence of games
to show that we can remove identifying information from the
ObtainKeyShareToken protocol.
• Game 0 is the Tandem privacy game, see Game 4 on
page 10.
• In Game 1, we extract the TS key-shares x0,S and x1,S
for users U0 and U1 from the TS’ proof of knowledge in
step I of the RegisterUser protocol, see Appendix B.
• In Game 2, we forge the user’s zero-knowledge proof of
correct construction of C, the commitment to the token
identifier id and the randomized ciphertexts, at the end
of ObtainKeyShareToken protocol.
• In Game 3, we replace the ciphertext id with the encryp-
tion of 0. The CPA security of the encryption scheme
ensures that the adversary cannot detect this change.
• In Game 4, we use the extractability of ExtCommit(·, ·)
to forge the user’s cut-and-choose proof in the Obtain-
KeyShareToken protocol, and send random commitments
Ci,∆i for i 6∈ D. However, we honestly construct C as
per the protocol.
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• In Game 5, for user Ui and the challenge token, we set
ci = E
+
pk(xi,S + δi, κi) for i 6∈ D, rather than using xS .
We commit to ci for i 6∈ D as usual. Lemma 3 shows
that with high probability we still follow the protocol
correctly.
• In Game 6, we omit xi,S altogether in the construction
of the unrevealed ci, that is, we set:
ci = E
+
pk(δi, κi) (12)
for all i 6∈ D, and use these values to construct C. When
answering RunTCP queries, user i adds xi,S , which we
extract during the RegisterUser protocol, to its long-term
secret-share xU to compensate for this change. The size
of the randomizers δi ensure that the TS cannot detect
this change.
We are now in the situation where the tokens held by user 0
and 1 are exchangeable. We use this to show that no adversary
can distinguish situations b = 0 and b = 1. We use a sequence
of games to interpolate between the two situations. We start
from Game 6.
• In Game A, the challenger uses b = 0 but otherwise
proceeds as in Game 6.
• In Game B, the challenger swaps the signatures of the
challenge tokens of users U0 and U1. By the blind
signature game, the adversary cannot detect this change.
• In Game C, the challenger also swaps the users U0
and U1 in the challenge phase. As a result, it perfectly
simulates b = 1 in Game 6. The privacy property
of the threshold cryptographic protocol (with colluding
respectively honest SP) ensures that the adversary cannot
detect this change.
Since these steps are indistinguishable, no adversary can
distinguish the situations b = 0 and b = 1 in Game 6,
and by indistinguishability again, neither can any adversary
distinguish these two in the original privacy game.
Proof of Theorem 2. Throughout this proof, we use a guess
for the challenge tokens i0 and i1 of users U0 and U1 respec-
tively. If this guess turns out to be wrong in the challenge step,
we abort and try again.
In Game 1, the challenger extracts x0,S and x1,S for users
U0 and U1. In particular, the challenger runs the knowledge
extractor on the proof of knowledge of the RegisterUser
protocol, see Equation 7, for each of the users. Since the
extractor uses rewinding, the adversary does not detect this.
In Game 2, the challenger forges the proof of knowledge
of correctness of the commitment C at the end of the Obtain-
KeyShareToken protocol for the challenge tokens i0 and i1 of
users U0, U1 respectively. By simulatability of this proof, the
adversary cannot detect this change.
In Game 3, the challenger replaces the encryption of the
token identifier id for the challenge tokens i0 and i1 with the
encryption of the value 0. The proof of knowledge of correct
encryption is already forged in the previous game. A reduction
to the CPA security of the encryption scheme shows that an
adversary that can distinguish Games 2 and 3 can break the
CPA security of the encryption scheme.
In Game 4, the challenger extracts the subset D from the
commitment ∆ as soon as it receives it. For the two challenge
tokens, the challenger (acting as the user) now proceeds as
follows. It computes Ci,∆i for i ∈ D as per the protocol.
However, for i 6∈ D it lets the unrevealed commitments Ci and
∆i commit to random values. The proof of knowledge that C
commits to the same values as Ci is already forged since a
previous step. Because the commitment scheme is information
theoretically hiding, the adversary cannot detect this change.
Despite the changes we made, the final token that is
stored by the user is exactly the same as in the original
ObtainKeyShareToken protocol. In Game 5 we compute the
values ci for user Uj and i 6∈ D as ci = E+pk(xj,S + δi, κi)
(recall, we extracted xj,S in the RegisterUser phase) instead of
ci = xS ·E+pk(δi, κi). Lemma 3 shows that with overwhelming
probability D+sk(xS) equals the value xj,S we extracted in
the RegisterUser protocol, so this change does not modify the
adversary’s view.
In Game 5, the user Uj computes
ci = E
+
pk(xj,S + δi, κi)
In Game 6, we remove the xj,S component from this equation,
and instead just compute
ci = E
+
pk(δi, κi) (13)
for the challenge tokens. To compensate for the fact that xj,S
is no longer included, the users adds xj,S to xU . As a result,
the threshold cryptographic protocol still completes as before.
The size of the domain from which the δis are drawn,
ensures that the adversary cannot detect this change. More
formally, the user sends cis, γis, and νis. However, the last
two sets are redundant, they can be computed directly based
on the cis. As a result, we can focus on δi = D+sk(ci). By the
size of the domain δis and the size of xj,S tuples (δ1, . . . , δk)
and (xj,S+δ1, . . . , xj,S+δk) are statistically indistinguishable.
As a result no adversary can distinguish Games 5 and 6.
We now show that no adversary can win Game 6. We again
use a sequence of games, but now interpolate between Game
A, where the challenger uses b = 0 in Game 6, and Game
C, where the challenger uses b = 1 in Game 6. We construct
the intermediate Game B, where user U0 uses the token i1 of
user U1 and vice versa. Since the challenge tokens in Game 6
(and thus in Games A, B, and C) do not depend on the user,
the threshold-cryptographic protocols complete correctly as in
Game 6.
We first show that Games A and B are indistinguishable.
Suppose to the contrary that A can distinguish Games A and
B. We show that we can use A to build an adversary B that
breaks the blindness property of the signature scheme. In the
blind signature game, B gets oracle access to two users that
request a blind signature on one message each. Adversary B
acts as the challenger towards A in Game 6. At the start of the
game B generates two messages, corresponding to key-share
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tokens, for which users U0 and U1 need a blind signature. It
creates:
m0 = (id,H(c1), . . . ,H(ck)) (14)
m1 = (id
′, H(c′1), . . . ,H(c
′
k)), (15)
where the values in the tuples are as in Game 6. Adversary B
sends m0,m1 to its blind signature challenger.
During the ObtainKeyShareToken protocols for the challenge
tokens, B simulates its users as follows. When user U0 is
running the blind signature protocol to create the challenge
token τ0, B uses the its challenger of the blind signature game
to act as the user. When U1 runs the blind signature protocol
to create token τ1, B again uses its blind signature game
challenger. Finally, the blind signature challenger outputs two
signatures σ0 and σ1 on messages m0 and m1 respectively.
Adversary B uses σ0 to construct the key-share token for user
U0, and uses σ1 to construct the key-share token for user U1.
If b = 0 in the blind-signature game, Bs challenge user first
blindly signed m0, so B perfectly simulates Game A. If b = 1
in the blind-signature game, then B perfectly simulates Game
B. Hence, any distinguisher between Games A and B breaks
the blindness property of the blind signature scheme.
We now show that if the TCP scheme is private (with
a colluding respectively honest SP), no adversary can dis-
tinguish between Games B and C. Suppose to the contrary
that adversary A can distinguish Game B from Game C.
We show that we can use A to build an adversary B that
breaks the privacy property of the TCP scheme. Adversary
B simulates users U0 and U1 towards A. The RegisterUser
and ObtainKeyShareToken protocols do not involve the users’
secrets, so B computes them directly. We now show how to
answer RunTCP queries.
Whenever A makes a RunTCP(Ui, j, inU ) query, B makes
a RunTCP(i, inU ) query of its challenger. Distinguisher B’s
challenger replies with the TS’ key-share x˜S . Let τ = (σ, ,
id, (cl, κl, δl)l=1,...,k) be the jth token of user Ui. Normally,
this token dictates a TS key-share unequal to x˜S , but we can
use the random oracle and change the token to ensure that the
TS will recover x˜S . To do so, adversary B picks δ′1, . . . , δ′k ∈R
{0, . . . , p2`}. Let δ′m be the largest, then we slightly increase
this value (by at most p) so that δ′m = x˜S (mod p). (With
overwhelming probability this modified δ′m is less than 32
`δ ;
if not, we try again.) Then, we pick κ′1, . . . , κ
′
k ∈R R and
set c′l = E
+
pk(δ
′
l;κ
′
l). Adversary B updates the random oracle
to ensure that H(c′i) = H(ci), i.e., the new pairs have the
same hash values as the original pairs. Next, B uses token
τ ′ = (σ, id, (c′l, κ
′
i, δ
′
l)l=1,...,k) to run GenShares with the TS.
The changes to the random oracle ensure that this token is
valid. Moreover, the changes to the random oracle succeed
with high probability since at no point in the games does the
TS learn the inputs to these hash-functions. The TS will derive
the correct secret share x˜S from τ ′. So it runs the correct TCP
protocol with the requested user which is simulated by B’s
challenger.
To answer A’s challenge queries, B again uses his chal-
lenger and proceeds as above to answer the queries. If b = 0
in the TCP privacy game, then B’s first run of RunTCP uses
user U0’s key, so B simulates Game B. Otherwise, if b = 1,
then B simulates Game C. So, any adversary A that can
distinguish Games B and C breaks the privacy property of
the TCP scheme. This completes the privacy proof.
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